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Tax avoidance that reduces transfers from shareholders to the government is 
traditionally viewed as value enhancing to shareholders. The agency perspective of tax 
avoidance, however, suggests that opportunistic managers may exploit the obfuscatory 
nature of tax avoidance to mask rent extraction. To shed light on these conflicting views, 
I use a self-constructed opacity index and multiple measures of tax avoidance to examine 
how corporate transparency relates to tax avoidance. I find that more transparent firms, 
which potentially have less severe agency problems, avoid more tax relative to their 
opaque counterparts. This result suggests that in a large section of the economy, tax 
avoidance is mainly engaged in by managers to enhance shareholder wealth. Further, I 
find that investors place a value premium on tax avoidance, but the price premium 
decreases with corporate opacity. This is consistent with the notion that corporate 
transparency facilitates the monitoring of managerial actions and thus alleviates outside 
investors’ concern with the hidden agency costs associated with tax avoidance. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This dissertation examines the relation among tax avoidance, corporate 
transparency and firm value. In chapter 2, I conduct a detailed review of two emerging 
streams of research: tax avoidance and corporate transparency. Chapter 3 discusses the 
sample selection and provides summary statistics. In chapter 4, I address the first research 
question: do transparent firms avoid more or less tax than their opaque counterparts? In 
chapter 5, I examine the second research question: is tax avoidance associated with firm 
valuation, and if so, does the strength of the relation depend on the extent of corporate 
transparency? Chapter 6 concludes. 
Income tax represents a significant cost to the firm and shareholders. Under the 
current tax regime, U.S. firms may need to transfer more than one-third of pre-tax profits 
to the federal, state, and local governments. Tax avoidance activities that reduce transfers 
from stockholders to the government should generally enhance shareholder wealth. 
However, an emerging stream of literature, which examines tax avoidance in an agency 
framework, suggests that opportunistic managers employ the technologies of tax 
avoidance to advance managerial, rather than shareholder, interests (e.g., Desai and 
Dharmapala 2009). To shield income from tax authorities, managers often attempt to 
obscure the underlying intent of tax avoidance transactions. The obfuscatory feature of 
tax avoidance can create a shield for insider (e.g., managers and controlling shareholders) 
expropriation. Thus, the agency perspective of tax avoidance suggests that tax avoidance 
may not always be desired by shareholders because the combined costs, which include 
costs directly related to tax avoidance activities (e.g., costs incurred for tax planning, tax 
penalties assessed by IRS, and additional compliance costs) and nontax costs, agency 
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costs in particular, may outweigh potential tax savings that accrue to shareholders. 
Agency costs, which specifically refer to price discounts imposed by shareholders, could 
substantially offset tax savings derived from tax avoidance transactions if outside 
shareholders believe the obfuscatory tax transactions are accompanied by managerial rent 
extraction. 
Another stream of research indicates that corporate transparency, which is defined 
as the availability of firm-specific information to outside shareholders, influences firm 
value.  Financial reporting transparency may increase the precision of publicly available 
information about management’s investment and operating decisions (e.g., Healy and 
Palepu 2001; Bens and Monahan 2004; Francis and Martin 2010).  External transparency, 
such as financial analyst following and press coverage, also plays a role in monitoring 
managerial behavior (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Lang et al. 2004; Miller 2006). Thus, 
corporate transparency may reduce the risk premium associated with the potential 
expropriation of shareholder wealth by opportunistic managers (Bushman and Smith 
2001, 2003).  
Tax avoidance may imply either managerial value-maximizing behavior or a 
greater potential for agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Since 
corporate opacity could be exploited by opportunistic managers to extract private benefits 
at shareholder expense, it offers potential for investors to infer the degree of coupling 
between tax avoidance and rent extraction. Specifically, a positive link between opacity 
and tax avoidance will suggest, on average, tax avoidance is more likely to be coupled 
with rent extraction. On the other hand, a negative link between opacity and tax 
avoidance will yield support for the view that tax avoidance is more likely to be engaged 
in by managers to enhance shareholder wealth. 
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A better understanding of the links among corporate transparency, corporate tax 
avoidance, and firm value are especially relevant for two reasons. First, the links between 
corporate transparency and tax avoidance may shed light on the prevalence of 
“complementarity” of tax avoidance and insider rent extraction. Management may 
engage in a variety of tax avoidance activities to reduce a firm’s tax burden. Such 
activities range from simply claiming favorable tax subsidies that are granted by the 
legislature, extensive tax planning that entails greater risks and uncertainty, to abusive tax 
shelters that have no business purpose other than tax avoidance. The proprietary and 
obfuscatory nature of tax avoidance, however, can potentially facilitate entrenched 
management to extract private benefits at shareholders’ expense.  
“Project Steele” undertaken by Enron offers a real world example. Enron entered 
this tax transaction mainly to manage pre-tax accounting earnings so that its opportunistic 
managers could benefit from the temporarily inflated stock price.
1
 In developing 
economies that are characterized by severe agency conflicts and weak investor protection, 
managerial rent diversion may take the form of direct theft of earnings. As a second 
example, Desai et al. (2007) revealed that, Sibneft, a Russian oil company, used various 
transfer pricing schemes and off-shore trading intermediaries to evade taxes and channel 
profits toward companies owned by Sibneft’s mangers. The increases in tax enforcement 
by the Russian government not only led to the closing down of Sibneft’s various off-
                                                 
1 As Enron would not be in a tax-paying position well into the future, “Project Steele”, a costly tax shelter 
allowing Enron to create $133 million in pretax financial accounting income, was implemented mainly to 
inflate pre-tax accounting earnings. Opportunistic managers thus could extract private benefit (e.g., excess 




shore trading intermediaries, but also coincided with an improved return for outside 
shareholders – Sibneft’s reported income soared and for the first time it issued dividends 
to shareholders.  
Despite a handful of extreme tax avoidance transactions revealed by the media, 
there is little large-sample evidence to show which perspective of tax avoidance 
dominates. The lack of detail in publicly available tax disclosure (e.g., tax footnote 
disclosure in firms’ filed 10K reports) makes it extremely difficult for outside investors to 
judge the nature of tax avoidance activities and determine whether tax avoidance is 
accompanied by diversion of rents. This difficulty is further exacerbated by the 
complexity of tax rules and managerial intentional omission of details. To avoid the 
potential scrutiny by tax authorities, managers have incentives to reduce the level of tax 
related disclosure even for tax transactions undertaken to enhance shareholder wealth.2 
The link between tax avoidance and corporate transparency may suggest whether 
managers engage in tax avoidance transactions to enhance shareholder wealth or extract 
rent in a large section of the economy. 
Second, as revealed by Enron and a few other high-profile scandals, the potential 
for value destruction is greater in firms that use aggressive tax activities to manufacture 
fake accounting earnings and to mask insider self-serving behavior. However, there are 
                                                 
2 Two studies directly examine tax related disclosures. In the mandatory disclosure context, Gleason and 
Mills (2002) find that firms often do not disclose material contingent tax liabilities as required by GAAP. 
In the voluntary disclosure setting, Schwab (2009) shows that managers are willing to disclose book-tax 
difference information in press releases when book-tax differences are primarily driven by tax avoidance. 
However, voluntary disclosure may not be a creditable mechanism to reveal managerial information 




only a few small sample studies showing that investors respond negatively to certain 
extremely aggressive tax transactions but little evidence on how investors value tax 
avoidance activities in general. To fill this gap, I provide large sample evidence on how 
investors value tax avoidance in general, and more importantly, whether the valuation 
implications of tax avoidance vary with corporate transparency. 
I rely on multiple measures to examine the relation between tax avoidance and 
corporate transparency. Specifically, I use cash effective tax rates and permanent book-
tax differences to measure tax avoidance. I construct an opacity index that ranks the 
relative opaqueness/transparency of firms along the following dimensions: earnings 
quality (measured as the magnitude of discretionary accruals), private information 
acquisition (measured as the level of analyst following), information dissemination 
(measured as the level of press coverage), and information uncertainty and asymmetry 
among investors (measured as the average daily trading volume). My sample consists of 
S&P 1500 firms in the period 1994-2001, a period marked by aggressive tax planning 
(e.g., Desai 2003; Jennings et al. 2009). Regressing tax avoidance measures on my self-
constructed opacity index, I find that the level of tax avoidance is positively related to 
corporate transparency. Specifically, transparent firms exhibit lower cash effective tax 
rates and larger permanent book-tax differences. These results still hold even after 
controlling for firm characteristics documented in prior studies that affect a firm’s tax 
planning incentives and tax planning opportunities. The positive (negative) links between 
corporate transparency (opacity) and tax avoidance (i.e., transparent firms are more likely 
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to avoid tax) lend support to the dominance of the value enhancing role of tax avoidance, 
suggesting that tax avoidance is more likely to be engaged in by managers to enhance 
shareholder wealth. 
To address the differential valuation implications of tax avoidance between 
transparent and opaque firms, I examine whether the interaction of tax avoidance and 
corporate transparency/opacity influences firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. The 
results indicate that on average investors place a price premium on tax avoidance, and 
this premium, however, decreases with the level of corporate opacity. These results 
continue to hold after controlling for other governance mechanisms (e.g., institutional 
investor monitoring and executive incentive compensation) that affect tax avoidance and 
firm value. 
My paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it contributes to 
the emerging literature examining agency cost implications of corporate tax avoidance. 
Specifically, I find that transparent firms avoid more tax and investors place greater value 
premium on tax avoidance for transparent firms. These results suggest that in the large 
section of the economy that I examine, the value enhancing effect of tax avoidance 
dominates.  
Second, my study also furthers our understanding of cross-sectional variation in tax 
avoidance by documenting how information environment has a significant impact on firm 
tax avoidance behavior. The positive links between corporate transparency and tax 
7 
 
avoidance suggest that firms operating in an opaque information environment tend to 
avoid less tax due to their concerns about potential price discounts imposed by investors.  
Lastly, my study also contributes to the corporate transparency literature (e.g., 
Bushman and Smith 2001, 2003) by examining the impact of corporate transparency on 
tax avoidance behavior. I use corporate tax management practice, a unique setting in 
which opportunistic managers could exploit the obfuscatory nature of tax avoidance 
activities to pursue their private benefit and a setting where outside investors face severe 
informational problems to assess such activities, to explore whether corporate 
transparency facilitates the monitoring of managerial behavior. The results suggest that 





Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
This study is primarily related to two streams of research – tax avoidance and 
corporate transparency. In section 2.1, I review the emerging literature that examines 
determinants and consequences of tax avoidance of publicly-traded firms. In section 2.2, 
I review research on corporate transparency, especially studies examining the impact of 
corporate transparency on real activities undertaken by corporate managers and the 
related effects on market valuations. 
2.1 TAX AVOIDANCE 
2.1.1 Background 
Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2009), I broadly define tax avoidance as the 
reduction of explicit taxes per dollar of pre-tax accounting earnings. However, there is no 
universally accepted definition of tax avoidance in the accounting literature.3 Under this 
broad definition, tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies, 
encompassing activities that are perfectly legal (e.g., municipal bond investments) and 
more aggressive transactions that fall into the grey area (e.g., abusive tax shelters).4 
Tax avoidance activities are traditionally viewed as tax saving devices that 
transfer resources from the state to shareholders and thus should increase after-tax firm 
value. An emerging literature in financial economics, however, emphasizes the agency 
                                                 
3For example, while Rego (2003) defines tax avoidance as using tax-planning methods to legally reduce 
income tax payments, Desai and Dharmaplala (2006) view tax avoidance as identical to abusive tax 
shelters. 
4Tax evasion, tax noncompliance, and tax shelters are concepts related to tax avoidance and frequently used 
in the financial economics literature. Tax shelters refer to very complicated transactions promoted to 
corporations and wealthy individuals to explore tax loopholes and provide large, unintended benefits (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 2003). Tax evasion refers to corporate tax reporting behavior that would, if 
discovered, be subject to civil or criminal sanctions (Crocker and Slemrod 2005). Tax noncompliance 
refers to corporate income tax that is legally owed but is not reported or paid (Slemrod 2004). 
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cost implications of tax avoidance and suggests that tax avoidance may not always 
enhance outside shareholder wealth. Under this alternative view, obfuscatory tax 
avoidance activities can facilitate managerial rent extraction in various forms.5 Since the 
combined costs, which include costs directly related to tax planning activities, additional 
compliance costs, and non-tax costs (e.g., agency costs in particular), may outweigh the 
tax benefits to shareholders, tax avoidance activities can potentially reduce after-tax firm 
value.  
Slemrod (2004), Crocker and Slemrod (2005), and Chen and Chu (2005) provide 
the theoretical foundation for understanding corporate tax avoidance within an agency 
framework. Slemrod (2004) argues that the separation of ownership and control in public 
corporations demands a different conceptual framework to understand tax reporting 
behavior of large publicly-held companies. The small existing literature on corporate tax 
noncompliance typically assumes that firm owners make tax reporting decisions rather 
than delegate decision makings to their agents, and such an assumption is certainly not 
true for large public companies. Thus, shareholders need to set up appropriate 
compensation and penalty structures to align managers’ interest with shareholders’ 
interest. In such a setting, to motivate managers to make value-enhancing tax reporting 
decisions, managerial compensation packages should be tied, explicitly or implicitly, to 
after-tax corporate profit. In addition, the penalty structure for corporate tax evasion 
should also take into account the separation of ownership and control (Crocker and 
Slemrod 2005).  
                                                 
5Managerial rent extraction is also broadly defined. It ranges from theft of corporate earnings, non arms-
length related party transactions, perquisite consumption, and excessive executive compensation. It also 
includes earnings manipulation (e.g., engaging in tax shelters to manufacture accounting earnings/operating 
cash flows as revealed by the Enron and Dynegy cases.), which temporarily inflates stock price and thus 




Desai and Dharmaplala (2006) examine corporate tax avoidance behavior in a 
setting where the manager decides the level of tax sheltering engaged by the firm and can 
also enjoy private benefits of control through the diversion of rents. In this setting, they 
investigate how incentive compensation affects the level of corporate tax sheltering. The 
key insight provided by their model is that the net impact of the use of incentive 
compensation on the level of tax sheltering critically depends on the relationship between 
tax sheltering and rent diversion. The rationale is as follows. Since higher-powered 
incentives (e.g., stock options) generally better align mangers’ interests with 
shareholders’ interests, they should increase the level of corporate tax sheltering and 
reduce the extent of managerial rent diversion. However, if tax sheltering and rent 
diversion are complements (e.g., tax sheltering may facilitate managerial rent diversion), 
then change in the level of one activity may change the cost of engaging in the other. 
Thus, the direct effect of incentive compensation on tax sheltering (e.g., increase in 
incentive compensation leads to increase in tax sheltering) could be offset by the positive 
feedback effect between tax sheltering and rent diversion (e.g., reduced diversion is 
accompanied by reduced sheltering). Their model also predicts that the impact of 
incentive compensation on tax sheltering may differ between firms with strong corporate 
governance and firms with weak corporate governance. Empirically, they find a negative 
association between the level of incentive compensation and the level of tax sheltering, 
and this negative association is primarily driven by poorly governed firms. The negative 
association between high-powered incentives and tax avoidance suggests that for poorly 
governed firms, the tendency toward more tax aggressiveness is offset by the fact that 
reduced diversion is associated with reduced sheltering. 
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Desai and Dharmaplala (2006) suggest that the strength of the positive feedback 
effect between tax sheltering and rent diversion may differ for firms in different 
information environment. Thus, transparent firms may engage in different level of tax 
sheltering than do opaque firms. Desai and Dharmaplala (2006) further indicate that as 
the extent to which tax sheltering and rent diversion are complementary may vary among 
firms, tax avoidance transactions may have different value implications for transparent 
firms than for opaque firms. 
2.1.2 Determinants and consequences of tax avoidance 
Over the past two decades, several studies provide interesting insights into why 
some firms avoid more tax than others. Early studies show that firms’ effective tax rates 
(ETRs) are associated with a range of firm characteristics. For example, Zimmerman 
(1983) finds that corporate effective tax rates are positively associated with firm size. 
This suggests that political costs play a role in determining corporate tax burdens.6 
Extending prior studies, Gupta and Newberry (1997) examine the association between 
corporate effective tax rates and firm characteristics beyond firm size. They find that 
ETRs are associated with a firm’s capital structure, asset mix, and profitability, but 
there’s no reliable association between ETRs and firm size. Rego (2003) examines 
whether economies of scale exist for investment in tax planning. She finds that more 
profitable firms and multinational firms with more extensive foreign operations have 
lower worldwide ETRs. Thus, economies of scale can significantly affect a firm’s ability 
to avoid tax. In sum, these early studies focus on firm characteristics as proxies for 
                                                 
6The focus of Zimmerman (1983), however, is not how firms avoid tax, but rather how political costs affect 
firms’ tax burden. His finding is consistent with the notion that large firms are subject to more scrutiny or 
more wealth is transferred from large firms (arguably more successful firms) to the government relative to 
other firms.  
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opportunities, incentives and resources for tax planning to explain why some firms avoid 
more tax than others. 
Several recent studies extend this line of research by examining how incentive 
compensation, ownership structure, and organizational form affect corporate tax 
avoidance. 
Using survey data, Phillips (2003) examines whether the use of after-tax 
accounting earnings in CEO and business-unit manager bonus plans leads to more 
effective tax planning. Consistent with the argument that managers need to be 
appropriately compensated for making optimal tax planning decisions, Phillips (2003) 
finds that firms have lower effective tax rates when they tie business-unit managers’ 
bonus plans to after-tax accounting earnings. However, he does not find such a link for 
CEO bonus plan.  
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) investigate the impact of higher-powered incentive, 
such as option-based executive compensation, on corporate tax sheltering. They find a 
negative link between the level of option-based compensation and the level of tax 
sheltering, and this negative link is primarily driven by poorly governed firms (e.g., firms 
with lower level of institutional ownership and more anti-takeover provisions). Thus, 
Desai and Dharmaplala (2006) show that both incentive compensation and other 
governance mechanisms play an important role in corporate tax avoidance. 
Using a proprietary dataset, Armstrong et al. (2010) examine the link between tax 
directors’ incentive compensation plans and various firm-level tax attributes. They find 
that executive compensation plans incentivize tax directors to effectively manage 
financial effective tax rates but bears no relation with cash effective tax rates. Rego and 
Wilson (2008) examine the impact of tax aggressiveness on executive compensation. 
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They find that executives are rewarded for being tax aggressive; they further show that 
this positive link reflects efficient contracting rather than rent extraction. Robinson et al. 
(2010) examine the link between the structure of corporate tax departments (profit center 
vs. cost center) and tax planning effectiveness. They find that corporate tax departments 
structured as profit centers are more effective in reducing financial ETRs but not cash 
ETRs. 
Chen et al. (2010) investigate how ownership structure affects differential tax 
aggressive behavior between family firms and non-family firms. While other empirical 
studies examine agency problems between management and shareholders, Chen et al. 
(2010) focuses on how agency conflicts between dominant shareholders and minority 
shareholders affect family firms’ tax avoidance behavior. They find that family firms are 
less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. This is consistent with the notion 
that to protect themselves from family owners’ potential expropriation masked by tax 
aggressiveness, minority shareholders may price discount family firms that pursue 
aggressive tax planning. Thus, family owners would rather forgo potential tax savings to 
avoid potential price discounts. 
Taken together, these studies significantly extend the line of research on corporate 
tax avoidance by shifting its focus from firm characteristics (e.g., proxies for tax planning 
opportunities) to various aspects unique to publicly-held firms (e.g., executive 
compensation and ownership structure) as determinants of corporate tax avoidance. The 
findings of this line of research, however, are mixed and incomplete. For example, 
incentive compensation plans seem to be more effective in motivating tax managers to 
manage financial ETRs than cash tax payments. There’s no conclusive evidence on 
whether CEOs or tax directors are more important in shaping corporate tax avoidance 
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policies. Thus, it’s not clear whether the board should write incentive compensation plans 
at the top executive level or business-unit manager (including tax director) level to 
achieve optimal tax avoidance. In addition, these studies also suggest that there are 
largely unexplored areas to explain why public firms exhibit differential tax avoidance 
behavior. 
While corporate tax avoidance may affect various stakeholders, the focus of my 
review is on shareholder wealth effects of tax avoidance. Tax avoidance activities are 
traditionally viewed as tax saving devices that transfer resources from the state to 
shareholders and thus should increase after-tax firm value, an emerging literature in 
financial economics emphasizes the agency cost implications of tax avoidance and 
suggests that tax avoidance may not always enhance outside shareholder wealth. 
Consistent with the agency cost view of tax avoidance, several recent studies find that 
investors do not always value corporate tax avoidance activities.  
Using the portion of book-tax gap unrelated to accounting accruals to proxy for 
corporate tax avoidance and using Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) find that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not 
significantly different from zero, but positive for firms with higher levels of institutional 
monitoring or lower level of anti-takeover protection. Their results suggest that investors 
do not always value tax avoidance activities given the potential severe agency problems 
inherent in poorly governed firms. 
Two recent studies investigate whether tax sheltering activities enhance 
shareholder wealth. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) examine the market reaction to news 
about tax shelter involvement. They find that such news announcements on average 
affect a firm’s stock price negatively. The price decline is more pronounced for retail 
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firms and firms with low cash effective tax rates. Thus, their small sample event study 
also shows that tax aggressiveness does not always increase firm value. Although 
primarily focusing on firm characteristics of corporate tax shelter participants, Wilson 
(2009) also sheds light on whether tax sheltering creates wealth for shareholders or 
facilitates managerial opportunism by examining stock return performance of tax shelter 
firms. He finds that tax sheltering firms with low anti-takeover protection outperform 
non-sheltering firms during each of the 24-month periods: pre-sheltering, active-
sheltering, and post-sheltering. This is consistent with the notion that tax sheltering 
creates wealth for well governed firms.  
Several small sample studies examine investors’ reaction to specific corporate tax 
avoidance activities. For example, Desai and Hines (2002) and Cloyd et al. (2003) 
examine the market reaction to firms’ inversion announcements. These studies find that 
the market does not respond positively, and often responds negatively, to these 
announcements, which at least suggests that investors interpret the potential tax savings 
derived from this type of tax avoidance activity in a complex manner.7 
In sum, the above studies present preliminary evidence challenging the simple 
value enhancing view of tax avoidance. The valuation effect of corporate tax avoidance 
seems to exhibit considerable cross-sectional variation. While opportunistic managers 
                                                 
7In the 1990s, a handful of high profile firms undertook “corporate inversion” or “expatriation” transactions 
by moving the legal domiciles of their parent corporations to a foreign country, typically a tax-haven 
country like Bermuda or Cayman. They claim these transactions can save many millions of dollars in future 
US corporate income taxes.  While Desai and Hines (2002) interpret their results as consistent with the 
notion that managers maximize shareholder wealth rather than share prices (e.g., managers engage in 
inversion transactions if the expected net tax benefits from inversions exceed the current capital gain tax 
liabilities), Cloyd et al. (2005) suggest that the lack of positive responses to these inversion decisions could 
be due to significant nontax costs offsetting potential tax savings from such transactions. Such nontax costs 





may employ the technology of tax avoidance to extract rents, managers at well governed 
firms are more likely to pursue value-enhancing tax avoidance. The existing research on 
economic consequences seems to mainly focus on some extremely aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies adopted by a handful of firms, but little evidence exists on the 
shareholder wealth effect of corporate tax avoidance in a large section of the economy. 
My study extends tax avoidance research in two ways. First, I examine whether 
corporate transparency is an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance. Second, I 
add to this line of research by providing large sample evidence on the valuation effects of 
corporate tax avoidance. Most importantly, I show how the valuation effect varies with 
corporate transparency, a mechanism relatively less explored but potentially important in 
affecting corporate real activities, including the complex tax management practice. 
 
2.2 CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY 
In this study, I construct a corporate opacity index to measure a firm’s overall 
information environment in the U.S. setting. This index is built upon the conceptual 
framework for corporate transparency developed by Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 
(2004). In section 2.2.1, I present an overview of this conceptual framework; in section 
2.2.2, I provide a review of research on corporate transparency with focus on its impact 
on corporate real activities and the related market valuation effects. 
2.2.1 A Framework for corporate transparency  
Corporate transparency, which is defined as the availability of firm-specific 
information to those outside publicly-traded firms, plays a central role in the efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) developed 
a framework (BPS framework) for conceptualizing and measuring corporate transparency 
17 
 
at the country level (also see Bushman and Smith 2001). In the BPS framework, 
information mechanisms of enhancing corporate transparency are broadly classified into 
three categories: corporate reporting, private information acquisition, and information 
dissemination.  
Corporate reporting involves periodic disclosure of firm-specific information on a 
voluntary or mandatory basis. Extensive and high quality disclosures provide useful and 
timely information to outside investors and thus are expected to enhance corporate 
transparency. Information intermediaries like accounting regulators and auditors may also 
promote reporting transparency by setting high-quality accounting standards and adding 
credibility to disclosures prepared by the management. Hence, in the BPS framework, 
reporting transparency is measured based on the following aspects: intensity and 
timeliness of mandatory disclosures (e.g., number of items disclosed in annual reports 
and the frequency of interim reports), quality of accounting principles, and the use of 
high-quality auditors. BPS constructs their transparency measures in a cross-country 
setting and certain aspects of their measures (e.g., quality of accounting standards) may 
be less applicable in a single country setting.8 
The private information acquisition component of corporate transparency refers to 
the information gathering and processing activities performed by financial analysts and 
private investors. Financial analysts and sophisticated investors (e.g., institutional 
investors) have the expertise and resources to better interpret publicly available 
information and acquire additional information through other sources. Bushman et al. 
(2004) use three measures of private information acquisition – the number of analysts 
                                                 
8 Bushman et al. (2004) measure corporate transparency for approximately 1000 large industry firms across 
forty plus countries. Their measures of reporting transparency are constructed based on Center for Financial 
Analysis and Research’s International Accounting and Auditing Trends.  
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following the firm, the average ratio of the value of pooled institutional investment to 
gross domestic product, and the existence of insider trading laws.  
In the BPS framework, the third component of corporate transparency is 
information dissemination, which is measured as the average rank of countries’ per capita 
number of newspapers and televisions. They argue that a well-developed communication 
structure facilitates the flow of information among economic agents.  Recent research, 
however, suggests that besides its rebroadcasting role, the media also analyzes and 
evaluates information acquired from various sources. More discussion on this point is 
provided in the next section. 
2.2.2 Prior research on corporate transparency  
A large body of research examines the capital market consequences of corporate 
transparency. That is, how transparency or a particular component of transparency affects 
liquidity and cost of capital. For example, several studies indicate that financial reporting 
quality is an important determinant of cost of equity and cost of debt. Francis et al. (2004) 
find that various earnings attributes (e.g., accrual quality, earnings persistence, 
smoothness, value relevance, and timeliness) are associated with cost of equity, and 
accrual quality has the largest cost of equity effect. Francis et al. (2005) find that firms 
with lower quality accruals have a higher cost of debt. Lang, Lins and Maffett (2009), 
which employ a comprehensive set of measures of corporate transparency (e.g., earnings 
management, accounting standards, quality of auditor, analyst following, and analyst 
forecast accuracy), find that in a cross-country setting, firms with greater transparency 
have lower transaction costs, greater liquidity, lower implied cost of capital, and higher 




However, the economic impact of corporate transparency is not limited to these 
more general capital market consequences; corporate transparency can also directly 
contribute to economic performance by disciplining corporate insiders in better selection 
of investments, more efficient management of assets in place, and reduced expropriation 
of minority shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001). This line of argument 
suggests that corporate transparency can affect specific real corporate activities.  The 
effect of corporate transparency on specific corporate policies, however, is less well 
understood relative to its general role in the capital markets. Hence, the following review 
primarily focuses on the links among corporate transparency, firm real activities, and the 
related economic consequences.  
Several recent studies shed light on how corporate transparency enhances firm 
performance through its monitoring and disciplining roles. Francis and Martin (2010) 
examine the monitoring role played by conservative accounting earnings in the 
acquisition context. They find that firms with more timely loss recognition make more 
profitable acquisitions and are less likely to engage in post-acquisition divestitures. Other 
studies along this line show that firms with higher financial reporting quality (e.g, 
accruals contain less estimation errors) are found to deviate less from predicted 
investment levels and exhibit less investment-cash flow sensitivity (e.g., Biddle and 
Hilary 2006, and Biddle et al. 2009). In contrast, firms with opaque financial reporting 
engage in suboptimal actions. Using an external indicator as a proxy for opaque financial 
reporting, McNichols and Stubben (2008) find that firms alleged to have manipulated 
earnings (e.g., firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by 
their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements) 
20 
 
overinvest during the manipulation period, and such over-investment is eliminated once 
earnings are no longer manipulated.  
Bens and Monahan (2004) document a positive association between the excess 
value of diversification and the quality of voluntary disclosure (measured as analyst 
ratings of voluntary disclosures developed by AIMR). This is consistent with the notion 
that commitment from managers to disclose provides shareholders with a means of 
monitoring management’s behavior and thus mitigating management’s penchant for 
cross-subsidizing underperforming segments. 
Taken together, these studies show that financial reporting transparency reduces 
information asymmetry between mangers and outside investors and constrains 
managerial opportunistic behavior by facilitating monitoring. Opaque reporting not only 
exacerbates moral hazard problems but may also distort information used by internal 
decision makers and lead to sub-optimal actions. 
  Prior literature suggests that financial analysts also serve as external monitors to 
corporate managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Chung and Jo 1976). Consistent 
with this notion, Lang et al. (2004) find that increased analyst coverage is associated with 
higher firm value, and this relation is especially strong for firms with potential severe 
internal governance problems (e.g., concentrated insider control) and operating in 
relatively low investor protection environments. Taking a more direct approach to 
investigate financial analysts’ monitoring role, Yu (2008) examines the relation between 
a firm’s financial analyst coverage and its earnings management behavior. He finds that 
firms with a higher level of analyst coverage engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management. Collectively, these studies suggest that financial analysts also act as 
independent monitors and provide important scrutiny over management’s actions. 
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With regard to the “information dissemination” component of corporate 
transparency, an emerging literature on media coverage provides some of the first 
evidence that the press may play an important role in corporate governance. Miller (2006) 
investigates the role of the press as an information intermediary in the context of 
accounting frauds. He finds that the press plays both a rebroadcasting role and an original 
investigative role in the coverage of accounting frauds. The study also indicates that the 
business-oriented press is more likely to undertake original analysis of accounting frauds 
and provide incremental information to the financial markets. Core et al. (2008) explore 
how the press monitors and influences executive compensation policies. They find that 
negative press coverage of CEO compensation is associated with excess annual pay, but 
does not bear a significant relation to total annual pay. This suggests that the press 
interprets CEO compensation in a sophisticated manner. However, they find no evidence 
that negative press coverage has material impact on the over-paid CEOs’ subsequent 
compensation policies or their career outcomes. This indicates that the monitoring effect 
of the press is quite limited in the U.S. executive compensation setting. Dyck et al. 
(2008), however, finds the media is an effective outside monitor in corporate governance. 
For a sample of Russian firms with known corporate governance violations, they find that 
coverage of those violations in the international press increases the probability that such 
violations are corrected. This suggests that the press is an effective monitor because it can 
impose significant international reputation costs on violating firms.  
All the above studies examine specific types of news articles (e.g., accounting 
fraud, CEO compensation and corporate governance violations) and present some early 
evidence on the monitoring role played by the press. In this study, I use the number of 
articles that mention the firm across all topics and across major U.S. news papers to 
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measure the overall firm-level press coverage. This is consistent with the idea that the 
media play its monitoring role by aggregating and creditably communicating information 
to the public. This will reduce the costs of collecting and evaluating information for 
various economic agents. Further, press coverage may increase management reputation 
costs and lead to regulator intervention for its identified wrong doings. 
Collectively, these studies show that corporate transparency can enhance 
shareholder wealth. My study extends this line of research in three ways. First, while 
prior studies measure a specific component of corporate transparency or measure 
transparency in an international setting, I develop a firm-level measure of overall 
information environments in the U.S setting.  Second, I use a unique setting, corporate 
tax avoidance, to examine the monitoring effect of corporate transparency. This setting 
offers several advantages. The extent and nature of corporate tax avoidance is probably 
one valuable piece of information that the management wishes to withhold from the 
public. On the one hand, increased disclosure about corporate tax avoidance may provide 
the roadmap for IRS scrutiny. One the other hand, recent research suggests that tax 
avoidance could be accompanied by managerial rent extraction (e.g., Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006). Thus, management may face agency costs of tax related disclosures if 
such disclosures reveal that managers engage in value destroying tax avoidance activities. 
Third, while most of existing studies (e.g., except for Anderson et al. 2009 and Lang et al. 
2009) examine the economic impact of a specific information mechanism, I examine how 
a firm’s overall information environment, which comprises of several interrelated 
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information mechanisms, monitors management behavior and influences shareholder 
wealth.9 
  
                                                 
9Anderson et al. (2009) measure corporate opacity as the number of analysts following the firm, analyst 
forecast error, trading volume, and bid-ask spread.  They examine the relation between ownership structure 
and corporate transparency. The purpose of their study is to shed light on whether family owners act as 
monitors or expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth. 
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Chapter 3: Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
My sample consists of firms that were members of the S&P 1500 index over the 
period 1994-2001. Specifically, the empirical analysis is performed on firms that were 
listed on the S&P 1500 index either on December 31, 1996 or on December 29, 2000. My 
sample starts from the mid 1990s, primarily because tax avoidance activities, especially 
those arising from corporate tax shelters, are believed to have proliferated greatly over 
this period (e.g., Desai 2003; Jennings et al. 2009).10 My sample ends in 2001 due to tax 
environment changes during the early 2000s that potentially affect corporate tax 
avoidance behavior. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 has 
increased the scrutiny of the corporate tax function and altered the cost of being tax 
aggressive (Jimenez-Angueira 2009). 
Data comes from various sources as described below. Financial accounting data is 
drawn from COMPUSTAT database, stock price and trading data are from CRSP, 
executive compensation data is from ExecuComp, and data on institutional ownership is 
from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings. Data on the number of analysts who 
provide earnings per share forecasts is obtained from IBES. All press coverage searches 
                                                 
10 Book-tax difference is often viewed as an indicator of tax shelters. There was a brief convergence of 
book-tax difference in the early 1990s, largely attributable to certain measures enacted in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (TRA 1986) that were designed to align book income and taxable income closely and the 
implementation of SFAS 109 in 1992 that changed the manner in which corporate tax liabilities were 
reported for financial reporting purpose (e.g., Plesko 2004). As the practice of using tax planning to 
enhance shareholder value became prevalent in the mid-1990s, the gap between taxable income and book 
income widened again. A large portion of the book-tax difference in the 1990s, however, cannot be 
explained by traditional factors (e.g., depreciation, foreign operations, and stock option deductions), 
suggesting that increased sheltering activities are at least partially responsible for book-tax differences 
arising in this period (Desai 2003). While primarily focusing on the impact of TRA 1986 on the corporate 
level implicit taxes, Jennings et al. (2009) find that the level of tax advantage of firms with high 
preferences in the pre-TRA86 regime started rising again in the 1990s and peaked around 2000. Thus, their 
findings also suggest that in the post-TRA86 era, firms rely more on aggressive tax planning strategies to 
lower their tax burden. 
25 
 
are performed on Factiva. I specifically examine four major U.S. newspapers, namely 
Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, and U.S.A Today. 
3.2 MEASURES OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
Following prior literature, I use three measures of tax avoidance. My first measure 
of tax avoidance is annual cash effective tax rate (CETR), the ratio of income taxes paid 
(#317) over pre-tax income (#170). Cash effective tax rate overcomes several major 
limitations associated with traditional effective tax rate. First, while traditional (accrual-
based) effective tax rate excludes potential tax savings resulting from tax avoidance 
activities that create temporary book-tax differences (e.g., accelerating expense deduction 
and delaying revenue recognition), cash effective tax rate reflects tax savings from tax 
planning strategies that create both temporary and permanent book-tax differences. 
Second, traditional effective tax rate includes tax contingencies (“cushion”) associated 
with uncertain tax positions taken on tax returns and may understate a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness. In contrast, tax reserves have no impact on cash effective tax rate, which 
could more accurately reflect a firm’s tax avoidance on the tax-return basis. However, 
cash effective tax rate also contains some measurement errors. For instance, it does not 
control for nondiscretionary items (e.g., depreciable and amortizable assets and the stock 
option deductions) that cause book-tax differences and thus may overstate tax 
aggressiveness for certain firms. Annual cash effective tax rate also contains 
measurement errors related to tax refunds for prior years, settlements of government 
audits, and estimated tax payments for future years.   
To mitigate the measurement error caused by the mismatch of the numerator and 
denominator, I also use long-run cash effective tax rate (LCETR), which is the ratio of 
the sum of cash tax payments (#317) over a five-year horizon divided by the sum of pre-
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tax income (#170) over the same five-year period, to measure tax avoidance (Dyreng et 
al. 2008). 
I also employ a book-tax difference based measure of tax aggressiveness. Mills 
(1998) finds that large book-tax difference is positively associated with IRS audit 
adjustments and Wilson (2009) finds that firms engaging in tax shelters exhibit large 
book-tax differences during active tax shelter years. This suggests that large book-tax 
differences could signal tax aggressiveness. Several studies, however, suggest that many 
other factors, such as aggressive financial reporting (e.g., upward earnings management) 
and general business conditions, could also contribute to large tax-book difference (e.g., 
Phillips 2003; Hanlon 2005; Seidman 2009). To mitigate the measurement error 
contained in book-tax differences attributable to earnings management, I choose 
permanent book-tax difference (PBTD) as a proxy for tax aggressiveness.  PBTD is 
computed as the difference between pre-tax book income (#170) and the adjusted taxable 
income ((#63+#64-#50)/.35), scaled by the beginning total assets (Frank et al. 2009). As 
the deferred portion of tax expenses has been purged out, this measure captures only tax 
avoidance strategies resulting in permanent book-tax differences. 
3.3 MEASURES OF CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY 
I develop an index that ranks the relative opacity/transparency (OPACITY) of 
each firm in the sample. Specifically, I rank four individual proxies for opacity (earnings 
quality, analyst following, press coverage, and trading volume) into deciles with the most 
opaque firms taking a value of ten and the most transparent firms assuming a value of 
one.
11
 The individual ranks are then summed and scaled by total possible points to derive 
                                                 
11 Other mechanisms that likely affect corporate transparency include accounting standard and auditor 
choices (e.g., Lang et al. 2009). However, these measures are not particular interesting in this study since 
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an index ranging from 0.1 to 1.0.  Lower values denote more transparent firms and higher 
values denote more opaque firms. Next, I describe how I measure various components of 
corporate transparency. 
I use an accruals-based metric (EARNOPACITY) to measure financial reporting 
transparency. Accrual-based metrics have been widely used in the accounting literature as 
a proxy for earnings quality.
12
  Specifically, EARNOPACITY is measured as the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model derived from Dechow 
et al. (1995) (e.g., Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). The large unsigned values of 
abnormal accruals are reflective of high deviations between a firm’s earnings and 
operating cash flows. Whether large accruals result from managers’ intentional 
manipulations of earnings or unintentional estimation errors, they make it difficult for 
outside decision makers to judge a firm’s fundamental performance (Hutton et al. 2009). 
I employ a cross-sectional version of modified Jones model to estimate the normal level 
of total accruals and define the abnormal accruals as the difference between a firm’s 
actual level and the expected level of total accruals. Measurement details are provided in 
Appendix B.  
I use the level of analyst coverage (COVERAGE) as a proxy for the private 
information acquisition component of corporate transparency. Specifically, COVERAGE 
is measured as the number of analysts providing earnings per share estimates as reported 
on I/B/E/S three quarters prior to the fiscal year end (e.g., Anderson et al. 2009).  
                                                                                                                                                 
my sample firms are large U.S. firms, and arguably, they follow the same set of accounting standards and 
use high-quality auditors.  
12 Other proxies for earnings transparency include earnings timeliness and accounting conservatism (e.g., 




I use the level of press coverage (NEWS) as a proxy for the information 
dissemination component of corporate transparency. Specifically, NEWS is measured as 
the negative of the natural logarithm of the number of articles containing the company’s 
name that appear in the major U.S. newspapers over the previous fiscal year. Following 
Francis et al. (2008), I examine four major U.S. newspapers: Wall Street Journal (both 
Weekday and Sunday Editions), New York Times, Washington Post, and USA Today. 
The last input into the index, trading volume (TURNOVER), provides a proxy for 
information asymmetry among investors (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The intuition 
of including this component is as follows. First, to the extent that it captures willingness 
to transact in firm shares, trading volume should be inversely related to the existence of 
information asymmetry. Second, financial reporting transparency incorporates both 
earnings quality and non-earnings transparency. Studies show that firms appear to 
supplement opaque earnings with other disclosures (e.g., Chen et al. 2002). TURNOVER 
should reflect information acquired through the earnings component and the non-earnings 
aspects of financial reporting transparency. TURNOVER is defined as the negative of the 
natural logarithm of the mean daily turnover ratio (e.g., the number of shares traded 
divided by the total shares outstanding from the daily CRSP) during the previous fiscal 
year. 
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1, Panel A, reports the sample selection procedures. I start with 14,355 firm-
year observations for S&P 1500 firms over the period 1994-2001. I lose 4,896 firm-year 
observations because they do not have sufficient data to calculate tax avoidance 
measures. 3,216 observations are lost because they either have negative pre-tax income or 
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because they do not have data on income taxes paid.13 1,347 observations are lost because 
they do not have 5-year data to construct long-run cash effective tax rates. I further delete 
934 observations because they do not have sufficient data to construct control variables 
and 2,255 observations because they do not have sufficient data to construct opacity 
index. My final main sample includes 6,720 firm-years for 1,344 unique firms.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the industry distribution of the firm-year observations. I 
describe the industry membership by using Fama and French (1997) classification 
scheme. The 6,270 firm-year observations represent 42 industries, with transportation, 
insurance, petroleum and natural gas, wholesale, chemicals, machinery, computers, 
electronic equipment, utilities, business services, and retail each having more than 200 or 
at least 3% of the sample observations.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of my main variables (TaxAgg and OPACITY) of 
interest by industry. TaxAgg exhibits considerable variation across industries. Precious 
metals, candy & soda, petroleum and natural gas, and banking industries exhibit the 
lowest LCETRs (e.g., < 25%), and machinery, construction materials, consumer goods, 
wholesale, construction, defense, shipbuilding, and railroad equipment industries claim 
the highest LCETRs (e.g., > 35%). Firms in precious metals, pharmaceutical products, 
electronic equipment, measuring and control equipment, and recreation exhibit the largest 
book-tax differences; firms in candy & soda, personal services, transportation and 
wholesale industries exhibit the smallest book-tax differences. Firms in textile, 
construction materials, electrical equipment, and fabricated products exhibit the highest 
                                                 
13 Following prior research, I deleted firm-years observations with negative pre-tax income because loss 
firms have different financial reporting and tax planning incentives (Rego 2003). 
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levels of opacity, while firms in precious metals, aircraft, beer & liquor, and petroleum 
and natural gas industries are on average the most transparent.   
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for tax avoidance, corporate opacity, and other 
firm characteristics. Panel A describes the main variables of interest. The mean and 
median CETR are 0.308 and 0.297, respectively, while the mean and median LCETR are 
0.316 and 0.318, respectively. These numbers are comparable to the mean and median 
values reported in Chen et al. (2010) and Dyreng et al. (2008). The mean and median 
levels of PBTD are 0.014 and 0.007, respectively, which are similar to those reported in 
Khurana and Moser (2009).  
Opacity measures vary considerably across sample firms. The median firm has an 
opacity index value of 0.55; a firm at the 25th percentile has an opacity index of 0.425, 
compared to a firm at the 75th percentile, which has an opacity index of 0.675. Panel A 
reveals that various inputs into the opacity index also display a fair amount of variation. 
The level of discretionary accrual has a mean value of 6.8% of lagged total assets with an 
inter-quarter range of 6.3% of lagged total assets.  
Turning to analyst coverage, the mean absolute value of COVERAGE is 1.73, 
suggesting that the average firm in the sample is followed by approximately 6 analysts; 
the absolute values of COVERAGE for firms at the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile 
are 2.40 and 1.10, respectively, corresponding to  11 and 3 analysts following. While 
firms at the 75th percentile do not receive any article counts, firms at the 25th percentile 
are covered by approximately 12 articles per year by the major U.S. news papers. The 
logarithm transformation of TURNOVER shows that firms at the 25th percentile have 
average daily turnover ratio of approximately 0.67%, and those at the 75th percentile have 
daily turnover ratio of 0.22%. 
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Panel B presents descriptive statistics for firm characteristics and other control 
variables. The average firm in the sample has total assets of $1.2 billion (i.e., the natural 
logarithm of total assets is 7.072), leverage of 0.223, pre-tax return on equity of 0.301, 
market-to-book ratio of 3.551, and about 55.4% institutional ownership.  A significant 
portion of top 5 executives’ annual compensation comes from stock option grants with 
the mean (median) ratio of 0.327 (0.302). Tobin’s Q, my measure of firm value, varies 
considerably across the full sample, with the average (median) firm having a Q ratio of 
2.232 (1.698). In addition, approximately 17% of observations in the sample have net 
operating loss carryover at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Table 4 presents correlations among the key variables. Correlations among the 
various tax avoidance measures are significant at the 0.001 level. As expected, annual 
cash effective tax rate (CETR) and long-run cash effective rates (LCETR) are positively 
correlated with each other, but the magnitude of the correlation (i.e., 0.461) suggests that 
annual cash effective rate may contain some measurement errors due to the mismatch 
between the numerator and the denominator as discussed in the previous section. Second, 
the cash tax rate measures are negatively correlated with permanent book-tax difference 
(PBTD), and the magnitude (i.e., the correlation between CETR and PBTD of -0.22; the 
correlation between LCETR and PBTD of -0.171) confirms that these measures capture 
different aspects of tax avoidance strategies as explained in section 3.2. Thus, it’s 
important to use multiple measures in the analysis, and similar results from different 
measures will lend more support to the inferences. 
Table 4 also reveals that OPACITY exhibits a significant positive correlation with 
cash tax rate measures and a significant negative correlation with permanent book tax 
differences, suggesting that opaque firms are less tax aggressive than their transparent 
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counterparts. In terms of firm value, simple correlations show that tax aggressive firms 
appear to be valued more relative to less aggressive firms; opaque firms also have lower 




Chapter 4:  The Association between Tax Avoidance and Corporate 
Opacity 
In this chapter, I address the first research question: do transparent firms avoid 
more or less tax? In section 4.1, I present hypothesis development and research design. 
Univariate analysis is presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 reports the main empirical 
results and additional analysis is provided in section 4.4.  
4.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1.1 Hypothesis development 
Tax rules are notoriously complex by nature. To avoid potential scrutiny by tax 
authorities, managers have incentives to obscure the underlying intent of tax avoidance 
transactions and reduce the level of tax related disclosures. Both federal income tax 
reporting and U.S. GAAP require some disclosure of book-tax disparity, arguably an 
indicator for tax aggressiveness (Mills 1998), but the amount of detail required and 
reported is rather limited during my sample period.14 In addition, firms may not provide 
sensitive tax information as required by GAAP in their filed 10K reports.15 Thus, it’s 
                                                 
14For example, Enron’s accounting reports and the tax footnote disclosure in particular, show that 
significant reconciling items that cause Enron’s GAAP effective tax rate to differ from the statutory rate of 
35% include basis and stock sale differences, foreign tax rate differential, and cash value in life insurance. 
But the lack of details in the tax disclosure makes it almost impossible for investors to learn the nature of 
transactions behind these line items. As the Joint Committee Report on Enron (U.S. Congress, Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 2003b) revealed, Enron engaged in several tax transactions (e.g., Project Tanya 
and Project Condor, corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) policies, and the use of subsidiaries (250) in 
low-tax (haven) countries) that generate significant large book-tax differences (McGill and Outslay 2004).  
 
15The insufficient tax disclosure is not limited to firms that are involved in high-profile scandals or the 
recent accounting scandal period. For example, using confidential IRS data and publicly available tax 
footnote data, Gleason and Mills (2002) find that large U.S. firms often do not disclose material contingent 




extremely difficult for outside investors to judge the underlying purpose of tax avoidance 
and the degree of complementarities between tax avoidance and diversion of rents. 
If the agency cost view of tax avoidance dominates, which suggests that tax 
avoidance creates a shield for managerial opportunistic behavior, then prior research 
suggests that firm opacity (e.g., opaque accounting and low level coverage by 
information intermediaries) will facilitate managerial opportunism. Thus, the dominance 
of agency cost view of tax avoidance will predict the following: 
H1 (a): opaque firms exhibit a higher level of tax avoidance relative to their 
transparent counterparts. 
On the other hand, income taxes represent a significant cost of doing business and 
reduce cash flows available to the firm. Managers whose interests are appropriately 
aligned with shareholders’ will engage in effective tax management to increase after-tax 
firm value. The complexity of tax rules and proprietary information about a firm’s tax 
positions, however, make it difficult for outside investors to gauge key driving forces of 
firms’ tax avoidance. As discussed in section 2, prior research suggests that corporate 
transparency allows outside investors to better monitor managerial opportunistic behavior 
(e.g., Lang et al. 2004, Francis and Martin 2010). With respect to firm tax management 
behavior, managers of transparent firms are more likely to engage in tax avoidance to 
enhance after-tax firm value and less likely to use abusive tax shelters to mask insider 
rent extraction.  Hence, the dominance of value enhancing view of tax avoidance would 
predict the opposite sign for the relation between tax aggressiveness and corporate 
transparency: 





Of course, there’s a third possibility that no relationship exists between tax 
avoidance and corporate opacity. If managers of some firms engage in tax avoidance 
primarily to extract rent, while others invest in tax planning to promote shareholder 
wealth, then the agency cost effect and the value enhancing effect of tax avoidance would 
coexist and cancel each other out. Thus, whether there’s a link between tax avoidance and 
corporate opacity is ultimately an empirical question. 
4.1.2 Research design 
I examine whether opaque firms avoid more or less tax using the cross-section of 
firm-year observations. Specifically, I estimate the following regression model: 
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+     + ,         (1) 
 
where i indexes firm, t indexes year, the dependant variable TaxAgg is the level of tax 
avoidance measured as cash effective tax rate (CETR), long-run cash effective tax rate 
(LCETR), or permanent book-tax difference (PBTD), and Opacity  is the value of the 
opacity index (see section 3.2 and section 3.3 for variable measurement). The control 
variables included in the model are: ROEi,t  return on equity, measured as operating 
income (#170-#192) scaled by beginning common equity (#60); LEVi,t  leverage 
measured as the sum of long-term debt (#9) and debt in current liabilities (#34) scaled by 
total assets (#6); NOLi,t-1 an indicator variable coded as 1 if loss carryforward (#52) is 
positive at the beginning of the year and 0 otherwise; ΔNOLi,t change in loss carryforward 
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(#52) scaled by beginning total assets (#6); FIi,t  pre-tax foreign income (#273) scaled by 
beginning total assets (#6); PPEi,t  the net property, plan, and equipment (#8) scaled by 
beginning total assets (#6); INTANGi,t  intangible assets (#33) scaled by beginning total 
assets (#6); UNCONi,t equity income in earnings (#55) scaled by beginning total assets 
(#6);  ASSETSi,t -1 natural logarithm of beginning total assets (#6); MBi,t-1 the market-to-
book ratio measured as beginning market value of equity (#199×#25) scaled by beginning 
common equity (#60); Age, firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of years the firm has been in Compustat. ICOPTIONi,t-1 the ratio of the Black-
Scholes value of stock options granted to top five managers to the value of total 
compensation; IHPERCENTi,t-1 the average ratio of shares owned by institutional 
investors in the previous year. 
The primary variable of interest is Opacity. The agency cost view of tax 
avoidance predicts a positive link between tax avoidance and corporate opacity. Thus I 
expect a positive coefficient (β1) on Opacity.
16
 Conversely, the value enhancing view of 
tax avoidance predicts an opposite sign on the relation between tax aggressiveness and 
corporate opacity. If the value enhancing view dominates, I would expect a negative 
coefficient (β1) on Opacity.  
I control for firm characteristics that are documented in prior literature to 
represent the presence of a firm’s tax planning opportunities. The rationale for including 
                                                 
16 For ease of reading, I use transformed annual cash effective rate (e.g., from CETR to 1-CETR) or long-
run cash effective rate (e.g., from LCETR to 1-LCETR) as a proxy for tax avoidance in the multivariate 
analysis. This way, larger values of all measures of tax avoidance represent higher levels of tax avoidance. 
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these variables in the regression model is that the extent of tax planning is limited by a 
firm’s opportunities to take actions to either decrease taxable income or increase tax 
credits (e.g., Phillips 2003). Following prior literature, I include leverage (LEV), foreign 
operations (FI), capital intensity (PPE), intangible intensity (INTAN) in equation (1) to 
control for a firm’s tax planning opportunities. Prior research shows mixed results on the 
relation between leverage and measures of tax avoidance, thus I do not predict a sign on 
LEV (e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1997 and Chen et al. 2010). As firms may choose to 
locate significant operations in low-tax foreign jurisdictions, I predict a positive sign on 
FI (e.g., Chen et al. 2010).17 Consistent with prior studies, I expect a positive sign on PPE 
(e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1997 and Chen et al. 2010).
18
 I include INTANG in the 
regression model but do not predict a sign on this variable for two reasons: first, the 
extent of intangible intensity may affect a firm’s opportunities to shift income; second, 
the book and tax treatment for intangible assets may differ (Grubert and Slemrod 1998 
and Chen et al. 2010).  
The second set of control variables that I include in the regression model are 
profitability (ROE), growth (MB), firm size (ASSETS), firm age (AGE), equity earnings 
(UNCON), and the presence of net operating losses (NOL and CNOL). Prior research 
yields mixed results on the relation between profitability and attributes of tax avoidance, 
                                                 
17Specifically, firms may choose to locate foreign subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions and defer 
repatriations of foreign earnings. For financial reporting purpose, they may take a position that foreign 
earnings are permanently reinvested. 
18The level of capital intensity may affect the attributes of tax avoidance in a couple of ways. First, capital-
intensive firms may lower their tax payments by taking accelerated depreciation for tax reporting purposes; 
second, capital –intensive firms may have more incentives to strategically locate their assets and thus lower 
their tax burden. 
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thus I do not predict a sign on ROE (Gupta and Newberry 1997, Chen et al. 2010).19  
Prior research suggests that growth firms may place less emphasis on tax planning, and 
thus I expect a negative sign on MB (Bankman 1994, Chen et al. 2010, and Robinson et 
al. 2010). I don’t predict the sign on ASSETS because prior research yields mixed results 
on this variable. For example, as a proxy for political cost, ASSETS would bear a negative 
relation to the level of tax avoidance (e.g., Zimmerman 1983); as a proxy for tax 
sophistication, ASSETS should be positively related to the level of tax avoidance (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2010). Age is included as another control for tax sophistication. 
I predict a positive sign on NOL and CNOL because firms can utilize net 
operating losses carried forward from prior years to lower their current year’s tax burden.  
To control for the differential treatment of equity earnings for financial reporting and tax 
reporting, I also include UNCON in the regression model.  
I expect that the level of tax avoidance varies across years and sectors of the 
economy. To capture these effects, I include industry and year dummies in the regression 
model. I estimate equation (1) using ordinary least square (OLS). I adjust the standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity and time-series correlation by using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). 
4.2 UNIVARIATE TESTS 
As a first step in examining the relation between firm-level opacity and tax 
avoidance, I separate the firm-year observations into three groups based on the value of 
                                                 
19A positive sign on ROE will be consistent with the notion that more profitable firms have more 
incentives and resources to engage in sophisticated tax strategies, and thus avoid more tax.  
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opacity index (e.g., firms in the 1st tercile are the most transparent, and the most opaque 
firms are in the 3rd tercile). Table 5, panel A, reports the mean and median level of tax 
avoidance for each group. The statistics show that transparent firms (e.g., firms in the 1st 
tercile) avoid more tax than opaque firms (e.g., firms in the 3rd tercile) across all three tax 
avoidance measures. While the mean (median) annual cash effective rate (CETR) for the 
most transparent firms is 29.5% (28.3%), the most opaque firms have mean (median) 
annual cash effective tax rate of 32.5% (31.4%) (p-values for differences=0.000). When 
tax avoidance is measured by long-run cash effective tax rate (LCETR), we also see that 
the most opaque firms tend to avoid less tax than the most transparent ones. Similarly, 
when tax avoidance is measured by permanent book-tax differences (PBTD), the most 
transparent firms exhibit significantly larger book-tax differences than the most opaque 
ones (e.g., mean, 0.016 vs. 0.013, p-value for difference=0.002; median, 0.008 vs. 0.006, 
p-value for difference=0.000). Taken together, these univariate results suggest that tax 
avoidance tends to be lower for the most opaque firms. 
With respect to control variables, transparent firms exhibit higher valuations (Q), 
greater profitability (ROE), higher growth (MB and GROWTH), greater size (ASSETS), 
and higher stock return volatility (RISK) relative to opaque firms. Transparent firms have 
higher level of foreign operations (FI) and more incidences of net operating losses (NOL) 
at the beginning of the year, though transparent firms and opaque firms are not 
significantly different in leverage (LEV), capital intensity (PPE), or the existence of 
intangible assets (INTANG).
20
 Transparent firms also have a higher level of institutional 
holdings (IHPERCENT) and use more stock options in their executive compensation 
                                                 
20 Since firms with negative pre-tax income are excluded from the sample, the existence of net operating 
loss carryforward suggests that firms may utilize acquired net operating losses to offset taxable income and 
thus reduce tax liabilities. 
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packages (ICOPTION). Since prior research shows that profitability, size, leverage, and 
other firm characteristics are likely correlated with tax avoidance measures, I primarily 
rely on multivariate analysis to examine the relation between corporate opacity and tax 
avoidance to ensure that the results are not driven by other fundamental differences 
between opaque firms and transparent firms. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the relation between corporate opacity and tax 
avoidance. The analysis is conducted by using three proxies to capture the extent of tax 
aggressiveness: annual cash effective tax rate (model 1-3), long-run cash effective tax 
rate (model 4-6), and permanent book-tax differences (model 7-9). For ease of 
interpreting the results,  I use the transformed cash effective tax rates (e.g., TCETR=1-
CETR and TLCETR=1-LCETR) to capture tax avoidance in the regression analysis such 
that larger values indicate more tax avoidance for both cash effective tax rate based 
measures and the book-tax difference based measure. The base models 1, 4, and 7 control 
for firm characteristics that represent the availability of firm-level tax planning 
opportunities; models 2, 5, and 8 include the percentage of option holdings in senior 
executives’ compensation packages to control for the incentive alignment effect; models 
3, 6, and 9 include the level of institutional ownership to control for the impact of outside 
investors’ monitoring on tax aggressiveness. Untabulated results show that inferences do 
not change when both sets of governance variables are included in the model. 
Across all nine models, I find that opaque firms are significantly less tax 
aggressive than transparent firms. In model 1, where tax avoidance is captured by annual 
cash effective tax rate, the coefficient on OPACITY shows that all else equal, one-
standard deviation increase in OPACITY implies a decrease in annual cash effective rate 
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by approximately 1% (-0.059*0.158). In model 4, where the long-run cash effective rate 
replaces the annual cash effective rate as a proxy for tax avoidance, OPACITY shows a 
even larger economic impact on tax avoidance (i.e., one-standard deviation increase in 
OPACITY is accompanied by 1.8% decrease in the long-run cash effective tax rate). 
When tax avoidance is measured by permanent book-tax differences as in model 7, a firm 
moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the opacity index will see a 
reduction in permanent book-tax differences of 0.3% of assets (-0.013*0.021).  
Overall, the control variables have the expected signs and are generally 
significant. For example, the results indicate that profitable firms, capital-intensive firms, 
and firms with extensive foreign operations exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance, 
suggesting that these firms have stronger incentives and more opportunities to engage in 
tax planning activities. I find mixed evidence on the relation between firm growth and tax 
avoidance: models 1-3 show that growth firms are less tax aggressive, consistent with the 
expectation that high growth firms place less emphasis on tax planning; other models, 
however, show that the level of tax avoidance is positively related to firm growth as 
measured by market-to-book ratio (MB).  
In the remaining models, where either the percentage of stock options or the 
percentage of institutional holding is included in the multivariate analysis to control for 
the impact of incentive or external monitoring on tax avoidance, the coefficients on 
OPACITY are still of similar magnitude and remain statistically significant. The 
coefficients on ICOPTION in model 3, 6 and 9 are all significant at above the 5% level. 
Consistent with stock options’ incentive alignment effect, the results show that firms 
granting a high level of stock options to senior executives also avoid more tax. The 
coefficients on IHPERCEN, however, are not significant in model 2, 5, and 8. 
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Overall, the above analysis indicates that opaque firms exhibit a lower level of tax 
aggressiveness relative to their transparent counterparts. These results are inconsistent 
with the notion that tax avoidance activities are mainly engaged in by opportunistic 
managers to extract rents; instead, the results suggest that managers of transparent firms, 
where outside investors are better able to monitor managers’ actions, engage in more tax 
avoidance activities to enhance shareholder wealth. 
4.4 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.1 The monitoring role of components of transparency 
 In my analysis of the link between tax avoidance and corporate transparency, I 
generally contend that corporate transparency is a monitoring tool that disciplines 
managerial tax avoidance behavior. Thus, I assume that tax aggressiveness is a function 
of corporate opacity. However, opacity may instead flow from tax avoidance. As 
revealed by the high-profile tax shelter “Project Steele”, Enron implemented this tax 
strategy primarily to inflate its financial earnings. This suggests that tax avoidance 
activities could lead to opaque earnings performance. Although table 6 reveals that there 
is a negative link between tax avoidance and the overall opacity index value, tax 
avoidance might bear a significant positive relation with the earnings component of 
corporate opacity. 
As a first step to address this potential reverse causality concern, I separate the 
opacity index into an internal component (earnings opacity) and an external component 
(market scrutiny) and examine their respective association with tax avoidance. The 
internal component of opacity, over which managers have relatively more control, is 
constructed by ranking firms into deciles based on the level of discretionary accruals and 
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dividing their rankings by a factor of 10 to provide an index value ranging from 0.1 to 
1.0. The relatively more exogenous external component of opacity, which assumes an 
index value ranging from 0.1 to 1.0, is constructed similarly by using the other three 
components of the original opacity index: analyst following (COVERAGE), trading 
volume (TURNOVER), and press coverage (NEWS).21 If tax avoidance is used as a 
technology to obscure firm performance (e.g., a tool for earnings management), then the 
level of tax avoidance should bear a significant relation to the level of discretionary 
accruals. Thus, consistent with this reverse causality story, I expect that there is at least a 
positive link between tax avoidance and earnings opacity.  
Table 7 provides regression results based on the two opacity components. In 
models 1-3, I use transformed CETR to measure tax avoidance. Model 1, where the value 
of opacity index is replaced by the internal component of opacity, shows that after 
controlling for other factors, internal opacity is negatively associated with tax avoidance. 
This negative link between earning opacity and tax avoidance does not support the notion 
that aggressive tax activities lead to opaque financial performance. Model 2, where 
corporate opacity is gauged by the market scrutiny component, also shows that tax 
avoidance is negatively related to the level of external opacity, suggesting that firms with 
intense market scrutiny pursue aggressive tax planning activities. Model 3 includes both 
the internal and external components in the regression, and both components exhibit 
significant a negative relation to the level of tax avoidance. Models 4-6 replicate the 
analysis after substituting long-run cash effective tax rate as the measure of tax 
avoidance, and the same inferences still hold. Models 7-9, where tax avoidance is 
                                                 
21 Of course, one may also argue that financial analysts are less inclined to follow tax aggressive firms and 
tax aggressiveness may limit investors’ willingness to transact in firm shares. This argument, however, 
seems unlikely. Tax transactions constitute only a relatively small part of the overall firm activities.  
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measured by permanent book-tax differences (PBTD), show that tax avoidance exhibits a 
significant negative relation to the market scrutiny component of opacity, but is not 
significantly related to earnings opacity. The positive but insignificant coefficient on 
earnings opacity provides no support for the reverse causality story. 
I also employ a simultaneous equation approach to address the potential 
endogeneity problem. Specifically, the first equation models tax avoidance as a function 
of opacity and a set of firm-specific factors as discussed in section 4.1.2; the second 
equation models opacity as a function of tax avoidance and a set of control variables that 
have been documented in the literature to affect various components of corporate 
transparency (e.g., operating cycle, cash flow volatility, stock return volatility, size, 
profitability, and growth). Untabulated results show that opacity significantly impact tax 
avoidance in the regressions of tax avoidance on opacity; tax avoidance, however, does 
not have a significant impact on opacity in most regressions of opacity on tax avoidance 
(e.g., the only exception is in the regression of opacity on annual cash effective tax rate, 
where tax avoidance has a marginally significant impact on opacity). 
Taken together, these results suggest that firms with more transparent earnings 
exhibit a higher level of tax avoidance. This does not support the alternative explanation 
that tax avoidance is used as a technology to obscure firm performance. In addition, tax 
aggressiveness also exhibits a significant negative association with the market scrutiny 
component of corporate opacity (e.g., firms with intense market scrutiny avoid more tax), 
which is inconsistent with the argument that aggressive tax avoidance transactions may 
reduce information intermediaries’ interests of following the firm and decrease the 
attractiveness of transacting in firm shares by investors.  
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4.4.2 Firm-Level analysis 
Since firms’ tax avoidance and opacity status may both experience little change 
over time, I conduct a firm-level analysis to address the potential concern of serial 
dependence in my data. Specifically, the firm-level CETR is measured as the aggregate 
cash tax paid divided by aggregate pre-tax income over the sample period; the firm-level 
PBTD is the mean PBTD over the sample period; for firm-level control variables that are 
ratios, I aggregate the numerators and denominators first before calculating the ratios; 
other firm-level control variables are the simple averages over the sample period. Table 8 
reports the regression results for the firm-level analysis of the link between tax avoidance 
and opacity. Models 1 and 2 report results where the dependent variable is firm-level 
CETR and models 3 and 4 report results where the dependent variable is firm-level 
PBTD. Consistent with the results in the firm-year level analysis, tax avoidance bears a 
significant negative relation to opacity across all four models, and the results are even 
stronger in the firm-level analysis. For example, in model 1 and 2, where tax 
aggressiveness is measured by cash effective tax rates, firms with one-standard deviation 




Chapter 5:  The Valuation Implications of Tax Avoidance 
In this chapter, I examine the valuation implications of tax avoidance. 
Specifically, I examine the role of corporate transparency in moderating the relation 
between tax avoidance and firm value. In section 5.1, I present hypothesis development 
and research design. In section 5.2, I report the empirical results, and additional analysis 
is provided in section 5.3.  
5.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1.1 Hypothesis development 
Section 2.2.2 suggests that corporate transparency potentially plays an important 
role in moderating the relation between corporate tax aggressiveness and firm value. 
Prior studies find that corporate transparency facilitates investor monitoring and thus 
constrains managerial opportunistic behavior (e.g., unprofitable acquisitions and empire 
building). If tax avoidance creates a shield by managers to expropriate outside investors, 
then tax aggressiveness would be a manifestation of severe agency problems. Since the 
hidden agency costs may substantially outweigh any potential tax savings from tax 
avoidance activities, outside investors will discount those firms for being tax aggressive. 
Corporate opacity will provide another layer of protection for insider rent extraction, 
facilitating related-party asset transfers, excessive perquisite consumption or outright 
theft of earnings. Corporate opacity exacerbates the hidden costs associated with tax 
aggressiveness.  The agency cost view of tax avoidance suggests a negative relation 
between tax aggressiveness and firm value as corporate opacity increases. Even if tax 
avoidance activities are predominantly tax savings devices employed by managers to 
increase after-tax firm value, corporate transparency could help alleviate outside 
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investors’ concern about potential agency problems underlying tax aggressiveness. Thus, 
the value enhancing view of tax avoidance suggests a positive relation between tax 
aggressiveness and firm value as corporate transparency increases. In sum, both views of 
tax aggressiveness suggest that corporate transparency increases the value of being tax 
aggressive. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
H2: price discount (premium) of being tax aggressive decreases (increases) with the 
level of corporate transparency. 
5.1.2 Research design 
Section 2.2.2 suggests that corporate transparency potentially plays an important 
role in moderating the relation between corporate tax aggressiveness and firm value. 
I employ the following regression model to test my second hypothesis - whether 
the interaction of tax aggressiveness and corporate transparency influences shareholder 
wealth: 
,
, , , ,
 ∑    ,  +     +     + ,                   (2) 
where i indexes firm, t indexes year, the dependant variable Qi,t, firm value, measured as 
the market value of assets (#6+#199*#25-#60) divided by the book value of total assets 
(#6). I use an indicator variable to capture tax aggressiveness TaxAggi,t,, which is coded 
as one if a firm is in the bottom CETR/LCETR tercile or top PBTD tercile. Opacityi,t is 
the value of the opacity index (see section 3.2 and section 3.3 for variable measurement). 
TaxAggi,t*Opacityi,t is the interaction term of opacity and the various measures of tax 
avoidance as described above. The control variables included in the model are: ROEi,t  
return on equity, measured as operating income (#170-#192) scaled by beginning 
common equity (#60); RISK, firm risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
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stock returns over the previous 36 months; Growthi,t, 3-year average sales (#12) growth 
from year t-2 to year t; LEVi,t leverage measured as the sum of long-term debt (#9) and 
debt in current liabilities (#34) scaled by total assets (#6); NOLi,t -1 an indicator variable 
coded as 1 if loss carryforward (#52) is positive at the beginning of the year and 0 
otherwise; ΔNOLi,t  change in loss carryforward (#52) scaled by beginning total assets 
(#6); FIi,t  foreign income (#273) scaled by begging total assets (#6); PPEi,t  the net 
property, plan, and equipment (#8) scaled by beginning total assets (#6); INTANGi,t  
intangible assets (#33) scaled by beginning total assets (#6); UNCONi,t   equity income in 
earnings (#55) scaled by beginning total assets (#6); ASSETSi,t-1 natural logarithm of 
beginning total assets (#6);  Age, firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of years the firm has been in Compustat.  
Following prior literature, I use Tobin’s Q (Q) to proxy for firm value and control 
for other factors that have been demonstrated to affect firm value, corporate transparency, 
and tax aggressiveness (e.g., Lang et al. 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Anderson et 
al. 2009). My primary variable of interest is the interaction of tax aggressiveness and 
transparency (TaxAgg*Opacity), and I expect a negative coefficient on this interaction 
term. While implicit taxes may have an impact on firm valuation, in this study I assume 
the magnitude of any implicit tax effect is too small to affect the inferences. The implicit 
tax effect should be less of a concern in my sample period given the finding that there is a 
sharp decline in implicit taxes at the corporate level following TRA86 (Jennings et al. 
2009).  
I include firm size (ASSETS), growth opportunities (GROWTH), leverage (LEV), 
performance (ROE), and firm risk (RISK) in the regression model because prior studies 
show that large, risky and highly-leveraged firms have low Q ratios, and high-growth 
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firms and firms with good past performance exhibit high valuations (e.g., Andersen et al. 
2009). In addition, I also include NOL, CNOL, FI, PPE, INTANG, UNCON, and AGE, 
which are significantly correlated with TaxAgg in equation (1). 
Industry and year dummies are included in the equation to control for industry 
and year fixed effects. I estimate equation (2) using ordinary least square (OLS). I adjust 
the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and time-series correlation by using robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009). 
5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 9 reports the regression analysis for the relations among tax avoidance, 
corporate opacity, and firm value. In Tobin’s Q regression models, I use an indicator 
variable to capture tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the tax aggressiveness indicator is 
coded as one if a firm is in the bottom CETR (LCETR) tercile or the top PBTD tercile in a 
particular year.  In models 1-3, I use annual cash effective tax rate to capture the extent of 
tax aggressiveness; In models 4-6, the extent of tax aggressiveness is captured by the 
long-run cash effective tax rate; In models 7-9, the permanent book-tax differences 
replace cash effective tax  rate based measures to capture tax aggressiveness. The base 
models 1, 4, and 7 control for firm characteristics that have been documented to affect 
firm value, corporate transparency, and firm-level tax planning opportunities. The 
remaining models include additional control variables, the percentage of option grants in 
senior executives’ compensation packages and the level of institutional ownership, which 
capture the impact of managers’ incentive and outside investors’ monitoring on tax 
aggressiveness.  
In the base model 1, the negative coefficient estimates on the opacity index (β2=-
0.793, p value < 0.01) indicate that investors place large discounts on corporate opacity; 
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the coefficient estimate on the tax aggressiveness dummy is positive and significant 
(β1=0.767, p value < 0.01), suggesting that investors place price premiums on tax 
avoidance. With regard to the primary variable of interest, the interaction term between 
opacity and tax avoidance, the significantly negative coefficient, indicates that as 
corporate opacity increases, tax avoidance exerts a negative effect on firm value (β3=-
0.978, p value < 0.01). From an economic perspective, a tax aggressive firm enjoys a 
price premium of approximately 5.0% relative to a less tax aggressive firm when both 
firms have average opacity; as corporate opacity increases by one standard deviation, the 
value premium enjoyed by the tax aggressive firm decreases to about 1.0%. The 
coefficients on the control variables are generally in the predicted direction, with Tobin’s 
Q increasing in growth and profitability, and decreasing in size, risk, and leverage. 
Overall, the results provide some evidence that investors value tax aggressiveness, but 
they discount tax aggressiveness for opaque firms due to potential severe agency conflicts 
in those firms. These results are consistent with the view that the effect of tax avoidance 
on firm value differs between well governed firms and poorly governed firms (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2009). 
The percentage of institutional holding and the percentage of stock option grants 
in senior executives’ compensation packages are included in models 2 and 3, 
respectively, as a proxy for an internal and an external governance mechanism. The 
results show that the inferences do not change in model 2 and model 3. Tobin’s Q bears a 
positive relation to tax aggressiveness, and is negatively related to opacity. In model 2 
and model 3, the coefficients on TaxAgg are of similar magnitude as in the base model 
and significant at the 1% level. In model 2, the absolute value of the coefficient on 
OPACITY is larger relative to those in model 1 and model 3. More importantly, the 
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coefficients on the variable of interest, the interaction term between tax aggressiveness 
and opacity, exhibit similar magnitude and statistical significance as in the base model.  
Somewhat surprising, model 2 shows that Tobin’s Q is decreasing with the level of 
institutional holding. In model 3, Tobin’s Q is increasing with the percentage of stock 
option grants, suggesting that the incentive alignment effect of stock options has a 
positive impact on firm value. In both models, the control variables are still in the 
predicted direction. 
Models 4-6 replicate the analysis substituting an indicator variable that equals 1 
when firms are in the bottom LCETR tercile. Consistent with the results in models 1-3, 
investors value tax aggressiveness, but the value premium is decreasing with corporate 
opacity. To gauge the economic significance, for two firms with the mean opacity index 
value, the tax aggressive firm enjoys a value premium of 4.6% relative to its non-
aggressive counterpart. When the opacity index value increases by one-standard 
deviation, the value premium enjoyed by the tax aggressive firm decreases to 2.2%. 
Models 7-9 replicate the same analysis by using the permanent book-tax difference 
indicator variable as the proxy for tax avoidance. All the main inferences do not change.  
5.3 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis in the prior section suggests that investors place a price premium on tax 
avoidance, and the premium increases with corporate transparency. The increasing 
premium indicates that the monitoring role played by corporate transparency alleviates 
investors’ concern about potential agency cost of tax avoidance. To provide further 
insights into the mechanism that facilitates outside investors’ monitoring, I examine the 
differential monitoring roles played by internal transparency and external transparency. 
Earnings transparency, over which management has more control, could be exploited by 
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opportunistic managers to hide true performance and extract rents. The price premium of 
tax avoidance is thus expected to be lower for firms with opaque earnings. Similarly, the 
lack of scrutiny by market participants and information intermediaries could facilitate 
managers pursuing value destroying tax avoidance. Table 10 tabulates regression results. 
In model 1, tax aggressiveness is captured by an indicator variable when firms are in the 
bottom cash effective tax rate tercile. In model 2, tax aggressiveness is captured by a 
long-run cash effective tax rate dummy. In model 3, the measure of tax aggressiveness is 
replaced by the permanent book-tax difference indicator dummy. Across all three models, 
the coefficients (β5) on the interaction of tax aggressiveness and external opacity are 
significantly negative, suggesting that firms lacking external scrutiny enjoy a smaller 
price premium for their tax avoidance activities. The interaction term of tax 
aggressiveness and earnings opacity, however, does not bear a significant relation to firm 
value. Taken together, these results suggest that the monitoring role is primarily driven 
by the external component of transparency. That is, firms intensely followed by 
information intermediaries have more creditable information available to outside 
investors and thus ensure managers to pursue tax avoidance activities mainly to enhance 
shareholder wealth. On the other hand, internal transparency, over which managers have 
relatively more control, provides limited information for outside shareholders to alleviate 




Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation investigates the relations among tax avoidance, corporate 
transparency, and firm valuation. While corporate tax avoidance is traditionally viewed 
as value enhancing, an emerging stream of research indicates that investors may not 
always value tax avoidance due to potential agency costs associated with tax avoidance 
activities. My work suggests that corporate transparency plays an important role in 
understanding the determinants and economic consequences of tax avoidance. Using 
S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2001, I first examine the relation between corporate 
transparency and tax avoidance. Using multiple measures of tax avoidance constructed 
from financial statements and a self-constructed comprehensive measure of corporate 
transparency, a firm-level opacity index, I find that transparent firms avoid more tax than 
opaque firms. This supports the notion that in a large section of the economy, value 
enhancing effects of tax avoidance predominate. To provide further insights, I decompose 
opacity into an internal component (e.g., earnings opacity) and a market scrutiny 
component, and explore their respective relation with tax avoidance. I find that both 
components bear significant negative relation to tax avoidance. To a certain extent, this 
alleviates the concern that aggressive tax transactions may lead to opaque earnings, and 
suggests that corporate transparency is an important determinant of firm-level tax 
avoidance. 
Next, I directly examine the valuation impact of tax avoidance and how this 
relation varies with corporate transparency. My analysis suggests that investors place a 
price premium on tax avoidance, but the value premium decreases as firms become more 
opaque. To shed light on the mechanisms facilitating investor monitoring, I conduct 
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additional analysis by separating corporate transparency into an internal (earnings 
transparency) component and an external (market scrutiny) component. I find that firms 
lacking market scrutiny enjoy smaller value premiums for their tax avoidance activities 
relative to those intensely followed by financial analysts and other market participants. 
Overall, my study indicates that tax avoidance enhances firm value, especially for the 
most transparent firms. 
My study contributes to two streams of research. First, in a unique setting -
corporate tax management practice, I demonstrate that corporate transparency plays an 
important monitoring role as a determinant of corporate tax avoidance decisions and 
attaching greater value premium to tax avoidance activities. Second, my study also 
furthers our understanding of firm tax avoidance behavior. The results show that all else 
equal, opaque firms engage in less tax avoidance activities than transparent firms. Since 
aggressive tax transactions are more likely to mask managerial rent extraction in opaque 





Table 1: Sample Description 
Panel A Sample selection  
Firm-years for S&P1500 firms, 1994-2001  14,355 a 
Less: firm-years with missing tax avoidance measures 4,896 b 
Less: firm-years with missing control variables 934
Less: firm-years with missing opacity measures 2,255



















Table 1: Sample Description (Continued) 
Panel B Industry distribution of sample firm-years c 
Industry # of observation % of Sample 
cumulative 
% 
Food Products 161 2.6% 2.6% 
Candy & Soda 12 0.2% 2.8% 
Beer & Liquor 26 0.4% 3.2% 
Recreation 34 0.5% 3.7% 
Printing and Publishing 114 1.8% 5.5% 
Consumer Goods 128 2.0% 7.5% 
Apparel 129 2.1% 9.6% 
Healthcare 70 1.1% 10.7% 
Medical Equipment 178 2.8% 13.5% 
Pharmaceutical Products 180 2.9% 16.4% 
Chemicals 247 3.9% 20.3% 
Textiles 55 0.9% 21.2% 
Construction Materials 174 2.8% 24.0% 
Construction 50 0.8% 24.8% 
Steel Works Etc 162 2.6% 27.4% 
Fabricated Products 15 0.2% 27.6% 
Machinery 291 4.6% 32.2% 
Electrical Equipment 19 0.3% 32.5% 
Automobiles and Trucks 175 2.8% 35.3% 
Aircraft 39 0.6% 35.9% 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 19 0.3% 36.2% 
Defense 23 0.4% 36.6% 
Precious Metals 7 0.1% 36.7% 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 31 0.5% 37.2% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 235 3.7% 40.9% 
Utilities 438 7.0% 47.9% 
Communication 88 1.4% 49.3% 
Personal Services 49 0.8% 50.1% 
Business Services 468 7.5% 57.6% 
Computers 310 4.9% 62.5% 
Electronic Equipment 418 6.7% 69.2% 
Measuring and Control Equipment 119 1.9% 71.1% 
Business Supplies 157 2.5% 73.6% 
Shipping Containers 29 0.5% 74.1% 
Transportation 221 3.5% 77.6% 
Wholesale 236 3.8% 81.4% 
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Table 1: Sample Description (Continued) 
Panel B Industry distribution of sample firm-years (continued) 
Industry # of obs. % of obs. 
cumulative 
% 
Retail 483 7.7% 89.1% 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 142 2.3% 91.4% 
Banking 38 0.6% 92.0% 
Insurance 227 3.6% 95.6% 
Trading 103 1.6% 97.2% 
Other d 170 2.7% 100.0% 
        
Total 6,270 100.0% 100% 
 
Notes to table 1: 
 
a. Firms were listed on S&P 1500 index either on December 31, 1996 or on December 29, 2000. 
 
b. Specifically, 3,216 observations are lost because they either have negative pre-tax income or no  
data on income taxes paid. 
 
c. Industries are defined on the basis of 4-digit SIC codes using the industry groupings identified in Fama and French 
(1997). 
 
d. Other industries include agriculture, entertainment, rubber and plastic products, sanitary services, steam, air conditioning 




Table 2: Sample Description – Main Variables by Industry 
Mean 
Industry a CETRb LCETRb PBTDb OPACITYc
Food Products 0.309 0.334 0.011 0.516 
Candy & Soda 0.237 0.225 0.001 0.585 
Beer & Liquor 0.301 0.305 0.025 0.439 
Recreation 0.328 0.310 0.026 0.537 
Printing and Publishing 0.412 0.440 0.003 0.550 
Consumer Goods 0.339 0.360 0.005 0.544 
Apparel 0.341 0.347 0.010 0.536 
Healthcare 0.319 0.330 0.009 0.608 
Medical Equipment 0.335 0.321 0.024 0.543 
Pharmaceutical Products 0.261 0.270 0.043 0.495 
Chemicals 0.310 0.327 0.009 0.618 
Textiles 0.324 0.329 0.002 0.625 
Construction Materials 0.327 0.354 0.008 0.630 
Construction 0.333 0.365 0.005 0.593 
Steel Works Etc 0.282 0.288 0.010 0.532 
Fabricated Products 0.328 0.272 0.007 0.667 
Machinery 0.335 0.352 0.018 0.570 
Electrical Equipment 0.384 0.332 0.015 0.634 
Automobiles and Trucks 0.354 0.347 0.012 0.572 
Aircraft 0.261 0.273 0.014 0.424 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0.294 0.438 0.002 0.493 
Defense 0.370 0.370 0.013 0.573 
Precious Metals 0.297 0.208 0.050 0.396 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0.331 0.343 0.025 0.624 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.208 0.242 0.007 0.482 
Utilities 0.328 0.312 0.006 0.591 
Communication 0.328 0.322 0.004 0.571 
Personal Services 0.296 0.324 0.001 0.599 
Business Services 0.315 0.313 0.022 0.565 
Computers 0.278 0.279 0.024 0.544 
Electronic Equipment 0.255 0.266 0.037 0.495 
Measuring and Control Equipment 0.308 0.344 0.029 0.550 
Business Supplies 0.332 0.328 0.004 0.584 
Shipping Containers 0.220 0.281 0.003 0.601 
Transportation 0.264 0.262 0.002 0.496 
Wholesale 0.362 0.361 0.002 0.602 
Retail  0.328 0.333 0.008 0.491 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 0.306 0.324 0.017 0.498 
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Table 2: Sample Description-Main Variables by Industry (Continued) 
Mean 
Industry CETR LCETR PBTD OPACITY 
Banking 0.239 0.246 0.000 0.505 
Insurance 0.270 0.283 0.009 0.551 
Trading 0.353 0.346 0.008 0.563 
Other d 0.319 0.317 0.011 0.579 
Sample mean 0.308 0.316 0.014 0.548 
Notes to table 2: 
a. Industries are defined on the basis of 4-digit SIC codes using the industry groupings identified in Fama and French 
(1997). 
 
b. Tax avoidance measures are annual cash effective tax rate (CETR), long-run cash effective tax rate (LCETR), and 
permanent book-tax difference (PBTD). See the Appendix A for variable measurements. 
 
c. The opacity index (OPACITY) provides a composite measure of opacity and is constructed by ranking four individual 
measures of opacity into deciles with the most opaque firms taking a value of 10. The four rankings are summed and 
divided by a factor of 40 to provide an index ranging from 0.1 to 1. See the Appendix A for variable measurements. 
 
d. Other industries include agriculture, entertainment, rubber and plastic products, sanitary services, steam, air conditioning 






Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Tax Avoidance, Transparency and Other Firm 
Characteristics 
Variable N Mean STD 25% Median 75% 
Panel A: Tax avoidance/aggressivenessa and opacity measuresb 
CETR 6,270 0.308 0.197 0.193 0.297 0.381 
LCETR 6,270 0.316 0.150 0.240 0.318 0.380 
PBTD 6,270 0.014 0.033 -0.001 0.007 0.020 
OPACITY 6,270 0.548 0.158 0.425 0.550 0.675 
EARNOPACITY 6,270 0.068 0.098 0.019 0.042 0.082 
COVERAGE 6,270 -1.725 0.863 -2.398 -1.792 -1.099 
TURNOVER 6,270 5.538 0.783 5.057 5.621 6.099 
NEWS 6,270 -1.331 1.724 -2.485 -1.099 0.000 
 
Panel B: Other firm characteristicsc 
Q 6,270 2.232 1.543 1.270 1.698 2.534 
ROE 6,270 0.301 0.254 0.172 0.263 0.384 
LAG_ROE 6,270 0.287 0.278 0.170 0.266 0.388 
LEV 6,270 0.223 0.168 0.077 0.219 0.339 
NOL 6,270 0.172 0.378 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CNOL 6,270 0.001 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FI 6,270 0.017 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.022 
PPE 6,270 0.381 0.267 0.179 0.317 0.543 
INTANG 6,270 0.110 0.173 0.000 0.028 0.156 
UNCON 6,270 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ASSETS 6,270 7.072 1.626 5.866 6.901 8.125 
MB 6,270 3.551 3.046 1.762 2.612 4.196 
RISK 6,270 0.108 0.048 0.073 0.099 0.133 
GROWTH 6,270 0.181 0.214 0.054 0.124 0.243 
AGE 6,270 3.087 0.674 2.485 3.219 3.689 
ICOPTION 6,063 0.327 0.248 0.120 0.302 0.503 
IHPERCENT 5,735 0.554 0.187 0.433 0.569 0.689 








a. Tax avoidance measures are annual cash effective tax rate (CETR), long-run cash effective tax rate (LCETR), and 
permanent book-tax differences (PBTD).  See the Appendix A for variable measurements. 
 
b. The opacity index (OPACITY) provides a composite measure of opacity and is constructed by ranking four individual 
measures of opacity into deciles with the most opaque firms taking a value of 10. The four rankings are summed and 
divided by a factor of 40 to provide an index ranging from 0.1 to 1. The four opacity index inputs are:  discretionary 
accrual (EARNOPACITY), analyst following (COVERAGE), trading volume (TURNOVER) and press coverage 
(NEWS). See the Appendix A for variable measurements. 
 
c. Q is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt scaled by the book value of assets, ROE is return 
on equity, LEV is long-term debt scaled by assets, NOL is an indicator variable for loss carry forward, CNOL is change 
in loss carry forward scaled by assets, FI is foreign income scaled by assets, PPE is property, plant, and equipment scaled 
by assets, INTANG is intangible assets scaled by assets, UNCON is equity income in earnings scaled by assets, ASSETS 
is the natural log of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, RISK is the standard deviation of monthly stock return 
for the previous 36 months. GROWTH is the average annual sales growth for the previous three years. Age is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm has been in Compustat. ICOPTION is the ratio of Black-Scholes 
value of stock options granted to the top five managers to the value of their total compensation. IHPERCENT is the 





Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Main Variable of Interest a 
 
 
Notes to table 4: 
 
a. Table 4 presents Pearson correlation matrix of key variables, and two-sided p values are presented in parentheses. 
  CETR LCETR PBTD Q OPACITY EARNOPACITY COVERAGE TURNOVER
LCETR 0.461 
  (0.000) 
PBTD -0.220 -0.171 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Q -0.122 -0.115 0.365 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
OPACITY 0.074 0.134 -0.057 -0.154 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
EARNOPACITY -0.020 -0.028 0.106 0.122 0.271 
  (0.122)   (0.028)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
COVERAGE 0.073 0.115 -0.036 -0.196 0.723 0.024 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.005)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.056) 
TURNOVER 0.108 0.160 -0.203 -0.274 0.453 -0.144 0.263 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
NEWS -0.006 0.032 -0.012 -0.096 0.598 0.069 0.393 -0.050 
  (0.618) (0.012) (0.337)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.002) 
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Table 5: Tax Avoidance and Transparency – Univariate Analysis a 
 
  
  Mean Median   P-Value 
OPACITY tercile Low 2 High Low 2 High   Mean Median
CETR 0.295 0.306 0.325 0.283 0.291 0.314 0.000 0.000 
LCETR 0.295 0.315 0.338 0.300 0.316 0.336 0.000 0.000 
PBTD 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.000 
Q 2.515 2.133 2.033 1.874 1.697 1.563 0.000 0.000 
ROE 0.324 0.295 0.281 0.282 0.257 0.248 0.000 0.000 
LEV 0.220 0.228 0.222 0.212 0.225 0.217 0.651 0.510 
NOL 0.196 0.173 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CNOL 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.672 0.918 
FI 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PPE 0.388 0.382 0.374 0.311 0.319 0.322 0.091 0.603 
INTANG 0.104 0.117 0.110 0.021 0.036 0.028 0.213 0.175 
UNCON 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.386 0.424 
ASSETS 7.850 7.012 6.313 7.782 6.886 6.185 0.000 0.000 
MB 4.224 3.480 2.915 3.086 2.635 2.196 0.000 0.000 
RISK 0.112 0.109 0.104 0.104 0.099 0.095 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 0.201 0.192 0.148 0.142 0.129 0.105 0.000 0.000 
AGE 3.156 3.048 3.054 3.296 3.178 3.219 0.000 0.000 
ICOPTION 0.403 0.329 0.240 0.397 0.301 0.210 0.000 0.000 
IHPERCENT 0.605 0.565 0.491 0.620 0.581 0.501 0.000 0.000 
64 
 
Notes to table 5: 
 
  
a. This table presents descriptive statistics of tax avoidance measures and firm characteristics separately for firms 
in different opacity groups. The last two columns report the two-sided p-values for the difference between 
transparent firms (1st tercile) and opaque firms (3rd tercile) in means and medians, respectively. T -tests 
(Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test for the difference in means (medians).   
 
b. CETR is annual cash effective tax rate, LCETR is long-run cash effective tax rate, and PBTD is permanent 
book-tax difference. 
 
c.  Q is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt scaled by the book value of assets, ROE is 
return on equity, LEV is long-term debt scaled by assets, NOL is an indicator variable for loss carry forward, 
CNOL is change in loss carry forward scaled by assets, FI is foreign income scaled by assets, PPE is property, 
plant, and equipment scaled by assets, INTANG is intangible assets scaled by assets, UNCON is equity income 
in earnings scaled by assets, ASSET is the natural log of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, RISK is 
the standard deviation of monthly stock return for the previous 36 months. GROWTH is the average annual 
sales growth for the previous three years. ICOPTION is the ratio of Black-Scholes value of stock options 
granted to the top five managers to the value of their total compensation. IHPERCENT is the fraction of shares 









Panel A: TaxAgg=1-CETRb Model 1  Model 2    Model 3  
Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT)  0.631 *** 12.14 0.643 *** 11.57 0.605 *** 11.75 
β1 (OPACITY)  -0.059 *** -2.82 -0.060 *** -2.65 -0.045 ** -2.11 
β2 (ROE) 0.148 *** 7.35 0.146 *** 7.01 0.154 *** 7.54 
β3 (LEV) 0.041 1.62 0.040 1.52 0.037 1.44 
β4 (NOL) 0.029 *** 3.27 0.030 *** 3.33 0.025 *** 2.77 
β5 (CNOL)  0.044 0.39 0.023 0.20 0.042 0.35 
β6 (FI)  0.278 *** 2.89 0.250 ** 2.53 0.255 *** 2.59 
β7 (PPE) 0.089 *** 5.00 0.086 *** 4.58 2.590 *** 5.17 
β8 (INTANG) -0.082 *** -3.87 -0.083 *** -3.71 -0.085 *** -3.92 
β9 (UNCON) 0.318 0.41 -0.103 -0.12 0.407 0.53 
β10 (ASSETS) -0.003 -0.89 -0.002 -0.77 -0.003 -0.85 
β11 (MB) -0.004 ** -2.54 -0.004 *** -2.58 -0.004 *** -2.92 
β12 (AGE)  -0.012 ** -2.00 -0.016 *** -2.58 -0.010 -1.60 
β13 (IHPERCEN)  0.012 0.63 
β14 (ICOPTION ) 0.055 *** 4.48 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
Adjusted R2 %      9.03      9.29       9.68     
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Table 6: Tax Avoidance and Transparency – Multivariate Analysis (Continued) 
 
  
Panel B: TaxAgg=1-LCETRc  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT)  0.787 *** 18.89 0.799 *** 18.71 0.761 *** 18.76 
β1 (OPACITY)  -0.115 *** -6.00 -0.118 *** -5.80 -0.099 *** -5.15 
β2 (ROE)  0.012 0.91 0.000 0.03 0.018 1.34 
β3 (LEV)  0.031 1.34 0.032 1.33 0.027 1.12 
β4 (NOL) 0.031 *** 3.68 0.036 *** 4.32 0.028 *** 3.26 
β5 (CNOL) 0.001 0.01 0.007 0.07 0.022 0.20 
β6 (FI) 0.177 ** 2.16 0.158 * 1.87 0.151 * 1.84 
β7 (PPE) 0.093 *** 5.87 0.087 *** 5.28 0.095 *** 6.04 
β8 (INTANG) -0.041 ** -1.98 -0.033 -1.49 -0.043 ** -2.09 
β9 (UNCON) 0.733 1.08 0.616 0.85 0.777 1.17 
β10 (ASSETS) -0.006 * -1.91 -0.006 ** -1.98 -0.005 * -1.82 
β11 (MB) 0.002 * 1.90 0.003 ** 2.23 0.002 1.38 
β12 (AGE) -0.017 *** -2.96 -0.019 *** -3.30 -0.013 ** -2.33 
β13 (IHPERCEN) 0.010 0.63 
β14 (ICOPTION )  0.045 *** 4.48 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
Adjusted R2 %      11.67      12.82      12.16     
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Table 6: Tax Avoidance and Transparency– Multivariate Analysis (Continued) 
  
Panel C: TaxAgg=PBTDd Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 0.039 *** 5.57 0.044 *** 5.65 0.034 *** 4.97 
β1 (OPACITY) -0.013 *** -3.29 -0.016 *** -3.88 -0.011 *** -2.88 
β2 (ROE) 0.011 ** 2.28 0.011 ** 2.09 0.010 ** 2.16 
β3 (LEV) -0.015 *** -3.72 -0.014 *** -3.26 -0.015 *** -3.57 
β4 (NOL) 0.001 0.70 0.001 0.76 0.001 0.32 
β5 (CNOL)  -0.002 -0.07 -0.001 -0.03 -0.004 -0.11 
β6 (FI)  0.113 *** 4.34 0.117 *** 4.40 0.105 *** 4.03 
β7 (PPE) -0.004 -1.19 -0.004 -1.12 -0.002 -0.77 
β8 (INTANG) -0.026 *** -7.34 -0.027 *** -7.32 -0.025 *** -7.01 
β9 (UNCON) 0.141 1.09 0.171 1.17 0.142 1.08 
β10 (ASSETS) -0.003 *** -5.41 -0.003 *** -5.46 -0.003 *** -4.96 
β11 (MB) 0.001 *** 2.64 0.001 ** 2.29 0.001 *** 2.66 
β12 (AGE) 0.000 -0.32 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.03 
β13 (IHPERCEN) -0.006 -1.59 
β14 (ICOPTION ) 0.006 ** 2.53 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
 
Adjusted R2 %      19.47      19.76      19.28     
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Notes to table 6: 
 
a. Firm-year level analysis of tax avoidance and corporate opacity. The regression model is: 
 
, , , , , + , + , , , , ,
, + , + , ,     ,  
 
b. In panel A (model 1-3), TaxAgg=1-CETR. See the Appendix for variable measurement. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
c.  In panel B (model 4-6), TaxAgg =1-LCETR. See the Appendix for variable measurement. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
d. In panel C (model 7-9), TaxAgg =PBTD. See the Appendix for variable measurement. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and 















Table 7: Tax Avoidance and Components of Corporate Opacity a 
  
Panel A: TaxAgg=1-CETRb Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 0.597 *** 12.41 0.606 *** 11.76 0.628 *** 12.05 
β1 (INTEROPACITY)  -0.026 *** -2.59 -0.027 ** -2.66 
β2 (EXTEROPACITY) -0.030 * -1.63 -0.032 * -1.72 
β3 (ROE) 0.147 *** 7.29 0.146 *** 7.34 0.148 *** 7.34 
β4 (LEV) 0.033 1.32 0.039 1.54 0.039 1.53 
β5 (NOL) 0.030 *** 3.38 0.029 *** 3.30 0.029 *** 3.29 
β6 (CNOL) 0.045 0.39 0.044 0.39 0.044 0.39 
β7 (FI) 0.290 *** 3.00 0.279 *** 2.89 0.283 *** 2.94 
β8 (PPE) 0.092 *** 5.13 0.088 *** 4.93 0.090 *** 5.07 
β9 (INTANG) -0.083 *** -3.91 -0.080 *** -3.79 -0.084 *** -3.92 
β10 (UNCON) 0.254 0.33 0.306 0.39 0.296 0.38 
β11 (ASSETS) 0.000 0.18 -0.001 -0.43 -0.002 -0.62 
β12 (MB) -0.003 ** -2.14 -0.003 ** -2.40 -0.003 ** -2.42 
β13 (AGE) -0.015 ** -2.47 -0.013 ** -2.06 -0.013 ** -2.14 
  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 6,270 6,270 
Adjusted R2 %      9.10%       9.03%       9.16%     
70 
 
Table 7: Tax Avoidance and Components of Corporate Opacity (Continued) 
  
Panel B: TaxAgg=1-LCETRc Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT)  0.693 *** 18.37 0.774 *** 18.37 0.790 *** 18.73 
β1 (INTEROPACITY) -0.017 ** -2.16 -0.018 ** -2.44 
β2 (EXTEROPACITY) -0.096 *** -5.53 -0.097 *** -5.60 
β3 (ROE) 0.009 0.70 0.011 0.80 0.012 0.89 
β4 (LEV) 0.016 0.71 0.033 1.43 0.033 1.42 
β5 (NOL) 0.033 *** 3.88 0.031 *** 3.67 0.031 *** 3.66 
β6 (CNOL) 0.003 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.01 
β7 (FI) 0.193 ** 2.32 0.170 ** 2.07 0.173 ** 2.11 
β8 (PPE) 0.095 *** 5.95 0.089 *** 5.65 0.091 *** 5.76 
β9 (INTANG) -0.039 * -1.87 -0.038 ** -1.82 -0.040 ** -1.93 
β10 (UNCON)  0.624 0.93 0.759 1.12 0.752 1.11 
β11 (ASSETS) (+) 0.001 0.49 -0.006 *** -1.91 -0.006 ** -2.05 
β12 (MB) (?) 0.003 *** 2.75 0.002 * 1.77 0.002 * 1.77 
β13 (AGE) (?) -0.021 *** -3.82 -0.015 *** -2.73 -0.016 *** -2.78 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 6,270 6,270 
Adjusted R2 %      10.80%       11.71%       11.71%     
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Table 7: Tax Avoidance and Components of Corporate Opacity (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: TaxAgg=PBTDd Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 0.027 *** 4.60 0.041 *** 5.67 0.040 *** 5.52 
β1 (INTEROPACITY) 0.001 0.46 0.001 0.30 
β2 (EXTEROPACITY) -0.013 *** -4.02 -0.013 *** -4.00 
β3 (ROE) 0.011 ** 2.19 0.011 ** 2.27 0.011 ** 2.27 
β4 (LEV)  -0.017 *** -4.10 -0.014 *** -3.55 -0.014 *** -3.55 
β5 (NOL)  0.001 0.82 0.001 0.66 0.001 0.66 
β6 (CNOL) -0.002 -0.07 -0.002 -0.07 -0.002 -0.07 
β7 (FI)  0.114 *** 4.36 0.112 *** 4.28 0.111 *** 4.27 
β8 (PPE) -0.004 -1.20 -0.004 -1.33 -0.004 -1.35 
β9 (INTANG)  -0.026 *** -7.19 -0.026 *** -7.29 -0.026 *** -7.26 
β10 (UNCON) 0.131 1.01 0.148 1.13 0.148 1.13 
β11 (ASSETS) -0.002 *** -4.56 -0.003 *** -5.71 -0.003 *** -5.67 
β12 (MB) 0.001 *** 2.97 0.001 ** 2.49 0.001 ** 2.49 
β13 (AGE) -0.001 -0.75 0.000 -0.06 0.000 -0.05 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 




Notes to table 7: 
 
a. Firm-year level analysis of tax avoidance and components of corporate OPACITY. The regression model is: 
 
, , , , , , + , + , , , ,
, , + , + , ,     ,  
 
where, TaxAgg=Measure of tax aggressiveness. OPACITY is separated into internal (INTEROPCITY) and external (EXTEROPCITY) components. 
INTEROPCITY is constructed by ranking firms into deciles based on the level of discretionary accruals and dividing their rankings by a factor of 10 to 
provide an index value ranging from 0.1 to 1. EXTEROPCITY is an index value ranging from 0.1 to 1 constructed based on the other three components 
of OPACITY: analyst following (COVERAGE), trading volume (TURNOVER), and press coverage (NEWS).The most transparent firms take a value 
of 0.1, and the most opaque firms take a value of 1. See the Appendix for variable measurement.  
 
b. In panel A, TaxAgg=1-CETR. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
c. In panel B, TaxAgg=1-LCETR. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
d. In panel C, TaxAgg=PBTD. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 




Table 8: Tax Avoidance and Corporate Transparency-Firm Level Analysis a 
Model 1b  Model 2b   Model 3c  Model 4c 
TaxAgg=1-CETR TaxAgg=PBTD 
Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 0.926 *** 10.61 0.812 *** 11.54 0.064 *** 5.79 0.049 *** 5.24 
β1 (OPACITY) -0.190 *** -3.28 -0.117 ** -2.19 -0.029 *** -4.29 -0.022 *** -3.51 
β2 (ROE) 0.009 0.56 0.007 0.62 0.005 0.99 0.010 ** 2.05 
β3 (LEV) 0.124 *** 2.67 0.127 *** 2.82 -0.011 ** -2.04 -0.011 ** -2.13 
β4 (NOL)  0.000 -0.02 -0.006 -0.40 -0.002 -1.00 -0.003 * -1.65 
β5 (CNOL)  0.019 0.12 -0.013 -0.08 -0.015 -0.23 0.017 0.30 
β6 (FI)  -0.029 -0.14 0.002 0.01 0.117 *** 3.30 0.011 *** 3.23 
β7 (PPE) 0.042 1.17 0.050 1.50 0.001 0.14 0.001 0.17 
β8 (INTANG) -0.105 *** -2.80 -0.130 *** -3.25 -0.021 *** -4.97 -0.020 *** -5.31 
β9 (UNCON)  -0.010 -0.01 0.162 0.21 0.137 0.48 0.092 0.30 
β10 (ASSETS) -0.012 ** -2.12 -0.016 *** -2.57 -0.004 *** -5.40 -0.004 *** -5.31 
β11 (MB) 0.000 *** -2.84 -0.001 *** -3.25 0.000 0.57 0.000 0.42 
β12 (AGE) -0.013 -0.88 0.004 0.22 -0.001 -0.37 0.000 0.02 
β13 (IHPERCEN) 0.024 0.46 -0.007 -1.47 
β14(ICOPTION ) 0.202 *** 2.99 0.007 1.54 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,269 1,338 1,269 1,338 
Adjusted R2 %      7.62% 8.98% 23.04% 25.07% 
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Note to Table 8: 
 
a. Firm-level analysis of tax avoidance and opacity. TaxAgg  is measured as 1-CETR in model 1&2 and as PBTD in model 3&4. The regression 
model is: 
, , , , , + , + , , , , ,
, + , + , ,     ,  
 
See the Appendix A for variable measurement. 
 
b. In model 1 &2, TaxAgg=1-CETR. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
c. In model 3&4, TaxAgg=PBTD. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 




Table 9: The Valuation Impact of Tax Avoidance and Corporate Transparency a 
 
 
Panel Ab Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 
TaxAgg=CETR indicator Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 4.908 *** 8.83 5.637 *** 9.65 4.781 *** 7.98 
β1 (TaxAgg) 0.767 *** 4.43 0.775 *** 4.44 0.742 *** 4.21 
β2 (OPACITY)  -0.793 *** -4.05 -1.147 *** -5.56 -0.640 *** -3.34 
β3 (TaxAgg*OPACITY) -0.978 *** -3.38 -0.960 ** -3.27 -0.962 *** -3.22 
β4 (ASSETS) -0.086 *** -2.80 -0.099 *** -3.00 -0.101 *** -3.17 
β5 (RISK)  -3.766 *** -4.12 -4.617 *** -4.74 -4.280 *** -4.49 
β6 (GROWTH) 0.644 *** 3.93 0.636 *** 3.61 0.617 *** 3.64 
β7 (LEV) -2.088 *** -5.99 -1.956 *** -5.32 -2.091 *** -5.79 
β8 (ROE) 1.153 *** 7.55 1.133 *** 7.11 1.204 *** 7.52 
β9 (NOL) -0.020 -0.28 -0.024 -0.32 -0.035 -0.49 
β9 (CNOL) 0.864 0.93 1.015 1.07 1.056 1.09 
β10 (FI)  7.593 *** 6.42 7.919 *** 6.63 7.481 *** 6.16 
β11 (PPE) 0.214 1.51 0.204 1.38 0.232 1.60 
β12 (INTANG) -0.507 *** -3.46 -0.526 *** -3.34 -0.537 *** -3.62 
β13 (UNCON) -1.207 -0.19 4.662 0.65 2.744 0.42 
β14 (AGE) -0.253 *** -4.46 -0.253 *** -4.29 -0.234 *** -4.03 
β15 (IHPERCENT) -0.809 *** -5.42 
β16 (ICOPTION) 0.550 *** 4.85 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
Adjusted R2 %      40.35 40.75 41.20 




Table 9: The Valuation Impact of Tax Avoidance and Corporate Transparency – (Continued)  
Panel Bc Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
TaxAgg=LCETR indicator Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat Coeff. T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT) 4.910 *** 8.27 5.656 *** 9.55 4.804 *** 7.94 
β1 (TaxAgg) 0.673 *** 3.44 0.694 *** 3.42 0.650 *** 3.25 
β2 (OPACITY) -0.832 *** -4.26 -1.183 *** -5.80 -0.676 *** -3.54 
β3 (TaxAgg*OPACITY)  -0.832 ** -2.49 -0.845 ** -2.43 -0.844 ** -2.44 
β4 (ASSETS) -0.088 *** -2.84 -0.100 *** -3.03 -0.103 *** -3.21 
β5 (RISK) -3.727 *** -4.09 -4.560 *** -4.69 -4.223 *** -4.44 
β6 (GROWTH) 0.615 *** 3.75 0.594 *** 3.37 0.590 *** 3.49 
β7 (LEV) -2.042 *** -5.89 -1.909 *** -5.22 -2.042 *** -5.69 
β8 (ROE) 1.120 *** 7.61 1.096 *** 7.16 1.167 *** 7.56 
β9 (NOL) -0.023 -0.31 -0.026 -0.35 -0.037 -0.51 
β9 (CNOL) 0.808 0.86 0.960 1.00 0.991 1.01 
β10 (FI) 7.617 *** 6.51 7.942 *** 6.71 7.536 *** 6.27 
β11 (PPE) 0.198 1.41 0.198 1.35 0.220 1.53 
β12 (INTANG) -0.502 *** -3.41 -0.517 *** -3.27 -0.535 *** -3.58 
β13 (UNCON)  1.792 0.27 4.856 0.68 2.882 0.44 
β14 (AGE) -0.254 *** -4.42 -0.256 *** -4.30 -0.235 *** -4.02 
β15 (IHPERCENT) -0.817 *** -5.44 
β16 (ICOPTION) 0.548 *** 4.82 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
Adjusted R2 %      40.22 40.62 41.05 
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Table 9: The Valuation Impact of Tax Avoidance and Corporate Transparency – (Continued) 
 
  
Panel C d Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
TaxAgg=PBTD indicator Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat   Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT)  4.454 *** 7.63 5.165 *** 8.90 4.358 *** 7.29 
β1 (TaxAgg) 1.112 *** 5.73 1.155 *** 5.77 1.057 *** 5.41 
β2 (OPACITY) -0.688 *** -4.02 -0.994 *** -5.33 -0.561 *** -3.23 
β3 (TaxAgg*OPACITY)  -1.010 *** -3.09 -1.076 *** -3.21 -0.937 *** -2.81 
β4 (ASSETS) -0.064 ** -2.14 -0.073 ** -2.27 -0.078 ** -2.50 
β5 (RISK)  -3.320 *** -3.73 -4.069 *** -4.32 -3.758 *** -4.07 
β6 (GROWTH) 0.618 *** 3.86 0.605 *** 3.52 0.595 *** 3.59 
β7 (LEV) -1.789 *** -5.34 -1.677 *** -4.77 -1.811 *** -5.22 
β8 (ROE) 1.041 *** 7.40 1.014 *** 6.95 1.096 *** 7.44 
β9 (NOL) 0.003 0.05 0.004 0.06 -0.011 -0.16 
β9 (CNOL) 0.999 1.11 1.137 1.24 1.198 1.28 
β10 (FI) 6.454 *** 5.39 6.783 *** 5.59 6.397 *** 5.21 
β11 (PPE) 0.227 * 1.64 0.226 1.55 0.240 * 1.68 
β12 (INTANG) -0.364 *** -2.56 -0.372 *** -2.43 -0.396 *** -2.75 
β13 (UNCON) -0.493 -0.07 1.842 0.25 0.561 0.08 
β14 (AGE) -0.241 *** -4.27 -0.249 *** -4.24 -0.223 *** -3.86 
β15 (IHPERCENT)  -0.808 *** -5.41 
β16 (ICOPTION) 0.504 *** 4.46 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 6,270 5,735 6,063 
Adjusted R2 %      42.17 42.57 42.93 
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Notes to table 9: 
 
a. Firm-year level analysis of tax avoidance, corporate opacity, and firm value. The regression model is: 
 
,
, , , , , , , , ,
, + , + , , , , , , ,
    ,  
 
b. Panel A, TaxAgg = Tax aggressiveness indicator, coded as one for firms in the bottom CETR tercile, zero otherwise. See the Appendix for variable 
measurement. T-values are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
c. Panel B: TaxAgg =Tax aggressiveness indicator, coded as one for firms in the bottom LCETR tercile, zero otherwise. See the Appendix for variable 




d. Panel C: TaxAgg=Tax aggressiveness indicator, coded as one for firms in the top PBTD tercile, zero otherwise. See the Appendix for variable 





Table 10: The Valuation Impact of Tax Avoidance – Monitoring Effect of Components of Corporate Transparency a 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Dependant Variable=Q TaxAgg=CETR indicator TaxAgg=LCETR indicator TaxAgg=PBTD indicator 
Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat  Coeff.   T-Stat 
β0 (INTERCEPT)  6.103 *** 10.30 6.127 *** 10.35 5.786 *** 9.93 
β1 (TaxAgg) 0.662 *** 3.84 0.601 *** 3.06 0.933 *** 4.98 
β2 (INTEROPACITY)  0.170 ** 1.99 0.109 1.18 0.045 0.63 
β3(EXTEROPACITY) -1.465 *** -7.28 -1.444 *** -7.30 -1.274 *** -7.24 
β4 (TaxAgg*INTEROPACITY)  -0.197 -1.32 -0.018 -0.11 0.220 1.38 
β5 (TaxAgg*EXTEROPACITY)  -0.758 *** -3.09 -0.776 *** -2.69 -1.055 *** -3.58 
β6 (ASSETS) -0.166 *** -4.51 -0.168 *** -4.53 -0.145 *** -4.08 
β7 (RISK) -6.506 *** -5.97 -6.512 *** -6.02 -6.109 *** -5.83 
β8 (GROWTH) 0.638 *** 3.51 0.595 *** 3.30 0.606 *** 3.44 
β9 (LEV) -1.798 *** -4.43 -1.759 *** -4.32 -1.591 *** -4.05 
β10 (ROE) 1.558 *** 6.59 1.558 *** 6.59 1.454 *** 6.46 
β11 (NOL) -0.045 -0.64 -0.050 -0.70 -0.024 -0.35 
β12 (CNOL) 1.743 * 1.76 1.687 * 1.70 1.900 ** 2.01 
β13(FI) 6.919 *** 5.60 6.891 *** 5.63 5.826 *** 4.66 
β14 (PPE) 0.133 0.88 0.120 0.80 0.138 0.93 
β15 (INTANG) -0.529 *** -3.47 -0.510 *** -3.34 -0.375 ** -2.54 
β16 (UNCON)  3.774 0.57 3.688 0.56 1.178 0.18 
β17 (AGE) -0.203 *** -3.56 -0.207 *** -3.59 -0.200 *** -3.51 
β18 (IHPERCENT) -0.985 *** -6.39 -0.997 *** -6.47 -0.979 *** -6.38 
β19(ICOPTION) 0.509 *** 4.45 0.506 *** 4.42 0.477 *** 4.20 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,554 5,554 5,554 
Adjusted R2 %      45.35 45.35 46.95 
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Notes to table 10: 
 
a. Firm-year level analysis of tax avoidance, components of corporate OPACITY, and firm value. The regression model is: 
 
, , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , ,  
,  
 
where, TaxAgg = Tax aggressiveness indicator, coded as one for firms in the bottom CETR tercile, zero otherwise in model 1; coded as one for firms in 
the bottom LCETR tercile, zero otherwise in model 2; coded as one in the top PBTD tercile, zero otherwise. OPACITY is separated into internal 
(INTEROPCITY) and external (EXTEROPCITY) components. INTEROPCITY is constructed by ranking firms into deciles based on the level of 
discretionary accruals and dividing their rankings by a factor of 10 to provide an index value ranging from 0.1 to 1. EXTEROPCITY is an index value 
ranging from 0.1 to 1 constructed based on the other three components of OPACITY: analyst following (COVERAGE), trading volume (TURNOVER), 
and press coverage (NEWS). The most transparent firms take a value of 0.1, and the most opaque firms take a value of 1. See the Appendix for variable 





Appendix A: Variable Measurement – Main Variables of Interest and Control 
Variables 
Variable Definition 
Cash effective tax rate 
(CETR) 
=Cash taxes paid / Pretax income; 
=#317/#170; 
CETR is set as missing when pretax income is <=0;  
CETR is truncated to the range [0, 1]; 
Long-run cash effective 
tax rate (LCETR) 
=the sum of cash taxes paid (#317) from year t-4 to year t / 
the sum of pretax income (#170) over the same period; 
Permanent book-tax 
difference (PBTD) 
={total book-tax difference – temporary book-tax 
difference}/lagged total assets; 
={Pretax income – (federal income tax +foreign income 
tax)/statutory tax rate - deferred tax expense / statutory tax 
rate}/lagged total assets; 
={#170 –(#63+#64)/STR – (#50/STR)}/lag #6; 
#64 is set as zero if missing; 
Tobin’s Q (Q) =(book value of total assets + market value of equity – book 
value of equity)/book value of total assets; 
= (#6 + #199*#25 - #60) / #6; 
Opacity Index 
(OPACITY) 






Estimation details are provided in the Appendix B. 
Analyst coverage 
(COVERAGE) 
= the negative of the natural logarithm of the number of 
analysts providing an annual earnings forecast three quarters 
prior to the company’s fiscal year end; 
Press coverage (NEWS) = the negative of the natural logarithm of the number of 
articles containing the company’s name that appear in the 
major U.S. newspapers over the fiscal year t-1; 
Trading Volume 
(TURNOVER) 
= the negative of the natural logarithm of the mean daily 
turnover ratio (e.g., the number of shares traded divided by 
the total shares outstanding from the daily CRSP) during 
fiscal year t-1; 
Equity in earnings 
(UNCON) 
=#55/lag #6; 
#55 is set as zero if missing; 
Change in NOL (∆NOL) =(#52- lag #52)/lag #6; 
Total accruals (ACC) =(Income before extraordinary items – operating cash flows) / 
lagged total assets; 
={#18 – (#308 - #124)}/ lag #6 
Profitability (ROE) = (#170 - #192)/lag #60 
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Leverage (LEV) =long-term debt/total assets; 
= (#9+#34)/#6 
Net operating loss 
(NOL) 
= Indicator variable coded as 1 if loss carryforward lag #52 > 
0; 
Change in NOL (∆NOL) = (#52 – lag #52)/lag #6; 
Foreign income (FI) = #273/lag #6; 
Property, plant, and 
equipment (PPE) 




Book value of total 
assets (ASSETS) 
= LN(#6); 




= 3-year average sales growth over year t-2 to year t; 
Sales growth= (#12-lag#12)/lag #12; 
Firm age (AGE) = LN(1+the number of years that the firm has been in 
Compustat); 
Intangible (INTANG) = #33/lag #6; 
#33 is set as zero if missing; 
Option grant 
(ICOPTION) 
The ratio of the Black-Sholes value of stock option granted to 




The fraction of the firm’s shares owned by institutional 




Appendix B – Estimate Discretionary Accruals 
 
I rely on the Jones model (Jones 1991) as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
normal accruals and abnormal accruals.  
 
Specifically, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression equation using firms in 
each industry (based on Fama and French (1997) industry classification scheme) for each 








,                        (1) 
 
where total accruals (ACC) are computed directly from cash flow statement (#123 – 
(#308-#124) as Hribar and Collins (2002) show that total accruals measured by using 
cash flow statement contain less measurement error than the ones derived from the 
balance sheet approach. 
 
 
Next, I estimate firm-level discretionary accruals as a fraction of lagged assets for firm j 
during year t (DiscAccj,t) by using equation (2). The parameters are estimated from Eq. 
(1). The original Jones model assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary, and following 
Dechow et al. (1995), I relax this assumption by assuming all changes in credit sales are 











  (2) 
 
where variables are defined as follows:  
 
Total accruals (ACC) =(Income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations– operating cash flows) / lagged total assets; 
={#123 – (#308 - #124)}/ lag #6; 
 
Change in sales (∆SALES) (#12 – lag #12) / lag #6; 
 
 
Gross property, plant, and 
equipment (GPPE) 
#7 /lag #6; 
 
 
Change in receivables 
(∆RECEIVABLES) 
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